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This paper offers a new method for a new pluralism. The author offers an examination of 
John Hick’s religious pluralism and George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s conceptual metaphor 
theory (CMT). After detailing the amendments required for both Hick’s pluralism and Lakoff 
and Johnson’s CMT the author offers an updated version of the former and an amended 
version of the latter. In the final section a ‘hyper-pluralism’ is offered as well as a method 
for the account of religious diversity through religious expression via living inter-personal 
conceptual schemata (RELICS).  
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The aim of this paper is to provide a method which can be used as a hyper-pluralist account 
of religious diversity. Before we can do that however, we must first designate the landscape 
this method will operate in. This first section is concerned with an evaluation of John Hick’s 
religious pluralism. It is from this evaluation we will reveal the amendments that need to be 
made in order for a hyper-pluralist position to be posited and maintained. Section II 
evaluates George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory, its shortcomings 
and the expansion it requires after hearing from pre-cognitive considerations. It is in the 
merging of the findings from these two sections which will constitute the work in Section III. 
Here we briefly entertain a possible alternative of this merging before establishing the 
hyper-pluralist position. Finally, I offer a method, based on work in Sections I & II, of 
accounting for religious diversity within the understanding of religious expression via living 
inter-personal conceptual schemata (RELICS). Irrespective of its manifestation all religious 
expression is comprised of this fundamental structure. Each subpart in the first two sections 
is accompanied by a subheading, these are the foundational building blocks which we will 
take with us into Section III. The motivation for this thesis is to create a foundation for inter-
faith dialogue which values difference as an opportunity for learning.     
PART 1: Hick’s Pluralism 
 
Pluralism is a theory concerned with explaining the presence of religious diversity. Pluralism 
holds that not all, but more than one religion can provide a means of salvation/liberation. 
Hick’s religious pluralism is a philosophical outlook which contends that most of the world’s 
great religious traditions are not only able to co-exist but are more or less equally salvific. 
This is because each of these religious traditions is an equally valid phenomenological 
response to a noumenal reality. Hick introduced his pluralism to the world prior to 1989, but 
it was in this year with his An Interpretation of Religion (hence known simply as 
Interpretation) that his hypothesis was fully formed. It is excerpts from this text that this 
first part relies on heavily. The following section is as much a clarifying of terms as it is an 
exposition of a theory. Although Hick’s pluralism operates in the same space as other 
philosophies of religion, he uses specific terms in specific ways. These terms denote 
foundational concepts in his theory; essentially, to understand the theory we must 
understand the terms. The two pillars of Hick’s pluralism are his adoption of the Kantian 
noumenal/phenomenal distinction and the soteriological concern of the world’s religions.  
 
First, the term pluralism comes from a typology for defining the different attitudes towards 
religious diversity. This threefold typology was first introduced by Christian theologian Alan 
Race in 1983, however a distillation of Race’s work can be found in Perry Schmidt-Leukel’s 
article Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism: The Tripolar Typology—Clarified and Reaffirmed. 
The definitions of the three types he provides are the following:  
 
i.) Exclusivism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by only 
one religion (which naturally will be one’s own)   
ii.) Inclusivism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by more 
than one religion (not necessarily by all of them), but only one of these 
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mediates it in a uniquely superior way (which again will naturally be one’s 
own).    
iii.) Pluralism: Salvific knowledge of a transcendent reality is mediated by more 
than one religion (not necessarily by all of them), and there is none among 
them whose mediation of that knowledge is superior to all the rest.1 
 
A discussion on inclusivism is outside the scope of this thesis but for Hick, the conflict 
between pluralism and exclusivism is one which can’t be resolved and therefore should be 
abandoned. To him the exclusivist is “encased in impenetrable armour”; the assertion that 
he knows a priori that all religious traditions are false except his own.2 Exclusivism is a 
common view shared by many religious adherents of many religious traditions. However, 
for Hick there is a responsibility for all philosophers of religion to account for the 
relationship and diversity between religious traditions.3 Exclusivism is not so much a theory 
of religious diversity but a lack of willingness to come to the table. 
 
Admittedly, Hick’s pluralism requires a concession; the admission of the argument for the 
“rational permissibility of trusting religious experience to be responsive as well as 
projective.”4 The admission of the religious pluralist, at least in Hick’s case, is the theory as a 
religious interpretation of religion. It maintains the central conceit that religious experience 
is not just an imaginative projection but can also be accompanied by a cognitive reaction to 
a transcendental reality.5 Naturally every religious tradition uses particular terms for their 
object of worship. Within his pluralist philosophy of religion, the term Hick nominates is ‘the 
Real’ or ‘transcendental Real’ which refers to “the postulated ground of the different forms 
of religious experience”.6 A brief note: Whilst not central to his theory Hick uses the term 
‘thought-and-experienced’ in his writing to denote the human experience of the 
phenomenal Real. I’ve included it here as it is a clear indication of Hick’s non-binary attitude 
to human religious interpretation.7 
 
Hick acknowledges early in Interpretation his adoption of pre-existing concepts within which 
to house his pluralism. One of these concepts is the delineation between what are termed 
pre-axial and post-axial religions. Pre-axial religions being those primarily but not exclusively 
concerned with the cosmic order of the universe and its safeguarding of a social hierarchy; 
with post-axial religions being those primarily but not exclusively concerned with liberation 
or salvation.8 This is primarily a sociological distinction that was born out of the coining of 
the first millennium of the common era as the ‘axial age’ whereby multiple civilisations 
culturally expanded rapidly roughly at the same time. This delineation is important for Hick 
because his theory is one which concerns post-axial religions specifically. However, as we 
                                                        
1 Schmidt-Leukel, Perry. “Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism: The Tripolar Typology—Clarified and Reaffirmed”. 
In The Myth of Religious Superiority, ed. Paul Knitter, (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2005), p20. 
2 Hick, John. 2006. "Exclusivism Versus Pluralism In Religion: A Response To Kevin Meeker". Religious Studies 42 
(2): p207. 
3 Hick, Exclusivism Versus Pluralism, p207. 
4 Hick, John. 11th December 2002. Letter to Peter Heath, Box 23, Hick Archives. 
5 Hick, John. 1997. "The Possibility Of Religious Pluralism: A Reply To Gavin D'Costa". Religious Studies 33 (2): 
p164. 
6 Hick, John. 2004. An Interpretation of Religion. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p236. 
7 Hick, Interpretation, evidenced at p36, p243, p250. 
8 Hick, Interpretation, p22. 
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will see later on, pre-axial religions play a role in elucidating the use of mythological 
language in religious traditions.  
 
Part 1.1 Kantian Distinction 
“The noumenal world exists independently of our perception of it and the phenomenal world 
is that same world as it appears to our human consciousness”9 
 
Although Hick adopts some of Kant’s epistemology it is important here to partition the 
separate uses of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction employed by each. Reductively, 
Kant’s first distinction operates as an epistemological foundation in the categories of 
understanding that the human mind uses to comprehend the world. Hick’s distinction is the 
transplanting of Kant’s distinction from general epistemology to specifically the 
epistemology of religion.10 In 2002 Hick admits to friend and contemporary Peter Heath that 
his use of Kant’s noumena/phenomenal distinction within a religious context is one which 
Kant himself would not have allowed.11 We know this because of the work Thomas William 
Ruston of the University of Birmingham has done in the analysis of an archive of Hick’s work 
both published and unpublished. Indeed, in Ruston’s own research he found that Heath 
voiced a concern that many of Hick’s critics continued to sound; namely, whether by giving a 
religious motivation for his philosophy of religion he takes the theory beyond criticism.12 
 
By any means, where Hick feels justified in his transplanting of the noumenal/phenomenal 
distinction is that the essence of the distinction remains intact. The relationship between 
the noumenal Real and its phenomenal manifestations is essentially the relationship 
between a noumenal reality and the variety of its occurrences to a plurality of perceivers. 
Language, as developed in and through this phenomenal realm of experience, is then only 
able to apply literally to that realm. In order to refer to a noumenal realm of reality, 
mythological language must be used.13 However, most religious adherents believe they 
speak literally of the noumenal Real when they assert something like “God is good”. For Hick 
literal and mythological are not mutually exclusive terms: 
 
“We speak mythologically about the noumenal Real by speaking literally or 
analogically about its phenomenal manifestations.”14  
 
This is because: 
 
“We have seen that all human awareness is in terms of meaning and that meaning 
always has a practical dispositional aspect: to be aware of a thing or a situation as 
having a particular meaning or character is to be in a dispositional state to behave in 
relation to it in ways that are (believed to be) appropriate to it having that character. 
                                                        
9 Hick, Interpretation, p241. 
10 Hick, Interpretation, p240. 
11 Hick, John. 11th December 2002. Letter to Peter Heath, Box 23, Hick Archives. 
12 Ruston, Thomas William. 2016. "The John Hick Papers: Religious Pluralism In The Archives". The Expository 
Times 128 (1): p9. 
13 Hick, Interpretation, p350. 
14 Hick, Interpretation, p351. 
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And the function of mythology is to express the practical meaning of its referent by 
evoking in us an appropriate dispositional response.”15  
 
In other words, the content of religious language is concerned with indicating the 
disposition of a religious individual towards the noumenal Real, a phenomenological act, 
rather than the impossible task of defining the noumenal Real. 
 
Both the ineffability and the ability to meaningfully talk about the transcendental Real are 
catered for within the theory. This is borne out in Hick’s adoption of the distinction between 
substantial and formal properties. Substantial properties such as ‘being all-knowing’, ‘being 
morally good’, and ‘being a fundamental force’ are all applicable to the phenomenal Real. 
Formal properties such as ‘being a referent of a term’ and ‘being beyond substantial 
properties’ are applicable or better, are appropriate for the noumenal Real.16 Hence 
ineffability exists as a formal property of the noumenal Real, with any and every description 
from post-axial religious traditions categorised as proposed substantial properties of their 
tradition-specific phenomenal Real.    
 
“Using this distinction between the Real an sich and the Real as humanly thought-
and-experienced, I want to explore the pluralistic hypothesis that the great world 
faiths embody different perceptions and conceptions of, and correspondingly 
different responses to, the Real from within the major variant ways of being human; 
and that within each of them the transformation of human existence from self-
centredness to Reality-centredness is taking place. These traditions are accordingly to 
be regarded as alternative soteriological ‘spaces’ within which, or ‘ways’ along 
which, men and women can find salvation/liberation/ultimate fulfilment.”17  
 
So, if the phenomenal Real, the Real an sich Hick describes above, and the noumenal Real 
are indeed the same thing then this raises the issue of how the ineffability of the latter is 
not reflected in the former. Hick believes we are still able to make meaningful statements 
about the phenomenal Real by speaking indirectly and mythologically.18 This relies on the 
interactive and reactive depiction of religious experience. This we will explore in closer 
detail in the subsequent parts of this section but first an introduction of the other pillar of 
Hick’s pluralism.  
 
Part 1.2 Soteriological Concern 
To what extent does a religious tradition hinder or promote a transformation of 
salvation/liberation? 
 
The reason for the pre/post axial distinction being as important as it is for Hick is because it 
is the definition of a post-axial tradition upon which his pluralism relies. If the function of 
post-axial religious traditions is to “create contexts within which the transformation of 
human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness can take place” then this is 
                                                        
15 Hick, Interpretation, p351. 
16 Hick, Interpretation, p239. 
17 Hick, Interpretation, p239-40. 
18 Hick, Interpretation, p350. 
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also the criterion by which their efficacy is judged.19 Hick finds what this salvation/liberation 
transformation looks like by studying the various post-axial religious traditions and 
recognising the moral precepts which he believes is apparent in all of them in various 
articulations. In Chapter 17 of Interpretation Hick provides these articulations in detail but 
when distilled these equate to the golden rule; it is good to benefit others and bad to harm 
them:   
 
“In each case it begins on the common ground of fair dealing and respect for others’ 
lives and property and leads on towards the higher ground of positive generosity, 
forgiveness, kindness, love, compassion, where we find the ethical evidence of the 
transformation of human existence from self-centredness to Reality-centredness.”20 
 
There is more to say on this matter, but it is best understood in light of the criticism Hick 
received for assuming that the primary concern of the major religious traditions is their 
soteriology. These criticisms will form a significant part of the subsequent discourse on the 
shortcomings of Hick’s pluralist hypothesis.  
 
Part 1.3 Conflicts and Disagreements 
Hick’s pluralism is one that not only acknowledges but accounts for the discord between 
religious traditions and their adherents 
 
One of the consequences of religious diversity is conflict and disagreement due to multiple 
doctrines asserting multiple cosmologies and lifestyles. Again, Hick delineates between 
these different types of conflict by providing three categories; historical, trans-historical and 
ultimacy. Disagreements over historical claims are those for which the definitive answer is 
technically accessible to human observation at some time. These are what Hick denotes as 
the ‘visible, audible and tangible constituents of past history’.21 Whether or not these claims 
are indeed true or false sometimes becomes secondary when considering the status that 
these purported claims maintain within their religious tradition. For some religious 
adherents these claims are fundamental pillars of their faith and therefore not open to 
debate. For these people specifically, the pluralist hypothesis is an inaccessible fantasy. 
However, for a growing number of religious adherents these historical claims are not 
quintessential to their belief structure. It is to these people that Hick offers his religious 
pluralism.  
  
Disagreements over trans-historical claims are those which in principle have a definitive 
answer but that answer is inaccessible because it cannot be verified with historical or 
empirical evidence. What happens, if anything, after someone dies? Some traditions claim a 
person is reincarnated, others that a another plain of existence awaits, and others again 
that there is nothing. Hick’s response to the conflict surrounding these claims is much the 
same as that towards historical claims - the conflicting nature of these claims does not alter 
the salvific efficacy of each religious tradition and their own particularity. So, whilst there is 
                                                        
19 Hick, Interpretation, p300. 
20 Hick, Interpretation, p314. 
21 Hick, Interpretation, p363. 
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indeed technically a correct answer to what happens to an individual after death, this 
answer is not pertinent to that same individual’s ability to achieve salvation/liberation.  
 
Disagreements over claims of ultimacy can be understood as those conflicts which occur 
around ultimate questions like the nature of the Real, the state of the universe, and the fate 
of the universe.22 These are the questions that are the ultimate mysteries of human 
existence: 
  
“Where do we come from? What are we here for? Where are we going?, in response 
to which the religious traditions have developed their various mythologies. These 
mythic pictures are true in so far as the responses which they tend to elicit are in 
soteriological alignment with the Real… They therefore do not conflict with one 
another as would rival factual hypotheses.”23 
 
Hick’s advice then in light of these various levels of conflict is that: 
 
“We ought to then consider the total belief-systems of the different traditions, 
composed as they are of elements of diverse logical types: experiential reports, 
mythologies, historical and trans-historical affirmations, interpretive schemes and 
concepts of the ultimate.”24 
 
When these religious traditions, including their elements mentioned above, are also 
understood for their use of ritual activities, ethical and lifestyle prescriptions, and social 
participation and orchestration we are left with complex temporal spiritual collectives. Each 
of these collectives mediating between its adherents and the noumenal Real through their 
phenomenal offerings; all more or less equally salvific.25  
 
Hick also accounts for the conflict that arises out of the two broad categories into which 
most manifestations of the phenomenal Real can be placed. These are personae and 
impersonae; the Christian God and the Islamic Allah within the former and the Taoist Tao 
and Advaita Vedanta Brahman within the latter. One of these two vastly different ways of 
conceiving and registering with the phenomenal Real surely must negate the other. Not so 
for Hick; he likens these personae and impersonae manifestations to the different ways of 
conceiving and registering light: 
 
“The purely physical structure of light is not directly observable; but under different 
sets of experimental conditions it is found to have wave-like and particle-like 
properties respectively… The reality itself is such that it is able to be validly conceived 
and observed in both of these ways.”26 
 
In this way the noumenal Real is not directly perceptible, but through experiential rather 
than experimental conditions, human beings are able to relate to it directly through the 
                                                        
22 Hick, Interpretation, p363. 
23 Hick, Interpretation, p375. 
24 Hick, Interpretation, p374. 
25 Hick, Interpretation, p375. 
26 Hick, Interpretation, p245. 
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phenomenal Real. If this relating is in the mode of the I-Thou encounter, then naturally the 
phenomenal Real encountered is that of the personae. Conversely, when an individual 
relates in a mode of non-personal awakening then the phenomenal impersonae is 
manifest.27  
 
Hick’s religious pluralism, as mentioned previously, is one which is not acceptable to 
everyone. This is what we will explore in the second part of this section. Otherwise, the 
foundation of the pluralist hypothesis is relatively uncontroversial. Its ontology is one which 
posits the equally valid desires and claims of the world’s religions and its ethics is one which 
holds that the key to salvation/liberation is the re-orientation of an individual from self-
centredness to reality-centredness; a call to compassion. Next a brief detour before 
continuing onto the criticism of Hick’s pluralism; it is important to note his genuine 
investment in the study of not only his home religion but other religious traditions as this 
informs the careful structuring of his pluralism.  
 
Part 1.4 Hick on Buddhism 
What is on offer are optional conceptualities which are a skilful means of articulating 
religious experience 
 
So whilst Hick may have been known first as a Christian his wide ranging study of the 
world’s religions was equally as known. One such example of this is his paper Religion as 
'Skilful Means': A Hint from Buddhism in which he discusses the concept of upaya (or 
upayakausalya). Whilst this concept is not a central tenet of all forms of Buddhism it is 
practiced and taught on varying levels within enough of those forms to warrant a closer 
study.28 And whilst this is not a central tenet of his pluralism, this paper is included to 
exhibit the applicability and compatibility of pluralism with a religious tradition outside of 
Hick’s own. 
 
The notion of upaya has and can be used in either a narrow or broad sense. The narrow 
meaning pertains to the skilful means by which a teacher leads a student or a group to some 
truth. This form of skilful means is characterised by the asking of leading questions so that 
the student or group may arrive at the truth themselves. This is because, whilst the teacher 
may know or be aware of a particular truth, declaring this knowledge is less skilful than 
guiding a student to their own understanding.29 The broader meaning pertains to the use of 
mental objects, particular perspectives or any alignment of oneself with a particular thing. 
Skilful means, in the broader sense, is about not becoming too attached to the concepts we 
employ to navigate our lives.30 
 
Hick touches on the concept of nirvana and asserts a personal preference. Namely his 
preference to speak not of an experience of nirvana but of a nirvanic experience. Nirvana is 
not an entity or place as the former might imply but is a state available to an ‘experiencer’.31 
                                                        
27 Hick, Interpretation, p245. 
28 Hick, John. 1991. "Religion As 'Skilful Means': A Hint From Buddhism". International Journal For Philosophy 
Of Religion 30 (3): 141. 
29 Hick, ‘Religion as Skilful Means’, p141. 
30 Hick, ‘Religion as Skilful Means’, p142. 
31 Hick, ‘Religion as Skilful Means’, p144. 
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Using his interpretation of the Pali Cannon, Hick’s notion of nirvanic experience is 
characterised as: 
 
“a state of complete inner freedom, equilibrium, peace, lack of angst and a sense of 
being entirely 'at home' and unthreatened in the universe, which expresses itself both 
in a positive affective state and in compassion for all forms of life.”32 
 
From this Hick accepts wholeheartedly that Gautama Buddha (Siddhattha Gotama in Pali) 
was home to a constantly manifesting nirvanic experience of reality. From this then, the 
Third Noble Truth - the possibility of the cessation of suffering - can be conceived of as a 
report of experience rather than a prescriptive theory.33 By extension then, not only the 
third, but all four Noble Truths may be regarded in the same manner. This is certainly in 
alignment with the broader sense of the concept of upaya.  
 
As Hick eloquently states: 
  
“All epistemic experience (experience that purports to be experience-of) involves the 
use of concepts which endow it with a meaning in terms of which we can behave 
appropriately in relation to that which is thus experienced. Our conceptual system is 
embodied in language, and the world as described is therefore always partially 
formed by the human experiencer and language user.”34 
 
The repercussions of such a statement is that it draws a line around and confirms the 
limitations of the human experience; that human awareness is necessarily confined by the 
human perspective. Hence, an intuition or experience of reality as it is, rather than from a 
human perspective, can never be expressed in any language. Hick suggests the only possible 
appropriate response would be silence.35 In choosing to speak rather that to remain silent in 
declaring the Four Noble Truths, Gautama Buddha was employing skilful means in order to 
convey something about his experience of reality in language whilst aware of the 
insufficiency of that very language.  
 
Hick then extends this to his own home religion. In classifying the Four Noble Truths as 
upayic he does so also with various elements of Christian doctrine. The deification of Jesus 
Christ, pictures of the afterlife in heaven, hell and purgatory as well as the doctrine of the 
church as the Body of Christ are all equally upayic. For Hick, because the human experience 
is exactly that, human, there are no eternal truths that one single religious tradition can 
provide. What is on offer are optional conceptualities which are a skilful means of 
articulating religious experience.36 The reason why so many adherents of various religious 
traditions have a negative reaction to this statement is that as a society we have been 
entombed in the notion that the literal is more important than the figurative. The 
subsequent section on the workings of metaphor will be largely orientated to excavating 
ourselves from this restrictive idea. But first, we turn towards Hick’s critics. 
                                                        
32 Hick, ‘Religion as Skilful Means’, p144. 
33 Hick, ‘Religion as Skilful Means’, p144. 
34 Hick, ‘Religion as Skilful Means’, p145. 
35 Hick, ‘Religion as Skilful Means’, p145. 
36 Hick, ‘Religion as Skilful Means’, p154. 
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PART 2: Criticism of Hick’s Pluralism 
 
The most substantial part of this section is reserved for criticism of Hick’s pluralism. First, we 
will explore the general problems that characterise the majority of Hick’s critics and then 
move into case studies which highlight specific issues with the theory. The critiques 
incorporated here all serve a process of shedding and dismantling those parts of Hick’s 
theory that are problematic. Whilst some criticism is relatively unwarranted and is easily 
resolved, other criticism is warranted and raises enduring issues for pluralism. Each are 
provided here to strengthen and reinforce the remaining aspects of Hick’s pluralism we will 
carry into the final section.  
 
Part 2.1: General Problems 
 
As mentioned previously, these problems are ones that most opponents of Hick would 
agree with. This is by no means an exhaustive list; some of these will be covered in greater 
detail in Parts 2.2 to Part 2.5. The inclusion of these particular problems is in their getting to 
the centre of Hick’s pluralism and the issues that arise from the positions he must take for 
its assertion.  
 
Pluralism as Coercion 
How tolerant really is a pluralist position when it comes against an opposing argument? 
 
Pluralism presupposes liberalism; specifically an ideology which values compromise and the 
evolution of traditional convictions. This isn’t inherently wrong however with this 
presupposition in mind, pluralism arguably contains an element of coercion. It requires a 
shift in understanding by most religious individuals.37 In light of this, pluralism faces 
opposition from inclusivism and exclusivism, with both able to make the point that their 
particular attitudes towards religious diversity are equally accessible to any and all religious 
traditions. They may regard each other as fundamentally wrong but this does not diminish 
the entitlement of each religion to believe itself to be uniquely correct.38 
Peter Donovan does provide a delineation between different types of pluralism. 
Namely, the pluralist approach to religious diversity grounded in epistemic and 
methodological motivations is different from those approaches defined by a prescriptive 
form theology or ideology.39 It is this second approach that he takes issue with and hence 
the inclusion of his criticism in this section.  
 
Theologically driven pluralisms like Hick’s rely on a seemingly self-appointed superior 
reference point upon which different religious traditions are measured against and through. 
It is hard to assert the superior reference point of one’s own theory when a key condition of 
said theory is there is no superior reference point. Why pluralism may be a form of 
                                                        
37 Donovan, Peter. 1993. "The Intolerance Of Religious Pluralism". Religious Studies 29 (2): p218. 
38 Donovan, Intolerance of Religious Pluralism, p219. 
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exclusivism; specifically how hard it is to maintain both pluralistic tolerance and the 
assertion that there is one true understanding of faith we will explore in more detail with 
Jonathan L. Kvanvig shortly. 
 
Conflicting Religious Experiences 
If a believer is capable of their own religious interpretations of the world they must accept 
that other believers may have other different and sometimes conflicting interpretations 
 
In 1990 Timothy R. Stinnett published his John Hick’s Pluralistic Theory of Religion in 
response to Hick’s own Interpretation a year prior. In this paper he breaks Hick’s theory 
down to its baseline presuppositions and implications. The full paper is a comprehensive 
attempt to dismantle Hick’s theory and deserves unabridged reading. However, from 
Stinnett we will take by example his first two perceived presuppositions of Hick’s pluralism: 
 
“PI: The religions are not completely delusory but are at least partially veridical 
responses to ultimate reality. 
P2: The world is systematically ambiguous for religious interpretations. The "facts" 
are compatible with religious and "naturalistic" interpretations.”40 
 
The first presupposition is a bold claim because it operates as an assumption. There is no 
explicit evidence for this claim and therefore cannot be settled by argument.41 This is 
generally what Hick has acknowledged in his description of his theory being a religious 
philosophy of religion. By extension, because of the assumptive nature of the first 
presupposition the onus is not on Hick to validify this statement but rather to elucidate the 
boundaries and conditions within which such an assumption is rationally adopted.42 A 
further consequence of Hick taking this route is that a separate and second onus is placed 
on Hick’s critics not only to disprove Hick’s theory but to also provide a more rational and 
equally comprehensive alternative.  
 
As previously stated, the first presupposition is one which Hick denotes as the basic religious 
conviction in which his theory of religious pluralism rests. It is a choice to interpret the 
world religiously. This basic religious conviction is born in an adoption of a specific religious 
tradition. This basic religious conviction is one which is available to every individual and 
every religious tradition. In other words, if this conviction can be applied to one religion it is 
applicable to each and every.43 In response, Stinnett submits a criticism analogous to that of 
many other critics: If a believer is capable of their own religious interpretations of the world 
they must accept that other believers may have other different and sometimes conflicting 
interpretations. Further, there are literally billions of these other interpretations; this is not 
only a rational but an expected ground to doubt one’s own interpretation.44 How a religious 
adherent may therefore commit fully to their own religious beliefs whilst also maintain their 
pluralism remains an unsurmountable task for Stinnett.  
 
                                                        
40 Stinnett, Timothy R. 1990. "John Hick's Pluralistic Theory Of Religion". The Journal Of Religion 70 (4): p572. 
41 Stinnett, Hick’s Pluralistic Theory, p572. 
42 Stinnett, Hick’s Pluralistic Theory, p572. 
43 Stinnett, Hick’s Pluralistic Theory, p572. 
44 Stinnett, Hick’s Pluralistic Theory, p581. 
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The second presupposition is that in order to evaluate the correctness of a religious claim or 
assertion of the world, one must first make the cognitive choice to interpret the world 
religiously. In this way Presuppositions One and Two are irrefutably linked. As Stinnett 
claims; “this does not amount to “proof” but to a rejection of proof as impossible.”45 
This second presupposition is based on Hick’s own theory of epistemology. Namely, 
that there are three layers of meaning which can be inferred from the world in which we 
inhabit. A natural, a socio-ethical and moral, and a religious level. The first is the physical 
meaning of the environment, involving basic meanings in order to comprehend and move 
safely through the world around us. The second is the level at which we perceive and 
ascribe meaning to the recognition that there are others who move through this world like 
us. At the third level both the first and second level of meaning are granted significance 
whilst also inhabiting the world as an environment either mediating, moderating or 
manifesting the ultimate Real.46  
 
There is an expansion of cognitive freedom exercised which occurs with the deepening of 
each layer of meaning. This is of import because what Hick asserts is that religious cognition 
is not separate from and therefore uniquely different than other modes of cognition but 
rather, like those other modes, inhabits a hierarchy in a similar fashion. 47 
Before continuing; substituting the term religious level for spiritual level is 
appropriate. This is an important distinction as it delineates between the metaphysical 
aspect of experienced reality as existing prior to any religious tradition. It also accounts for 
individuals who assert they have had phenomenal experiences of the transcendental Real 
outside of a specific religion. Still, religious traditions are certainly the most popular ways in 
which to access and ascribe the meaning Hick refers to in his epistemology.    
 
 
Pluralism as Exclusivism 
“When one holds that the rites of religion X are correct in a pluralistic way, one is 
reformulating or reconstructing X in light of the metaphysics on the basis of which one holds 
one’s pluralism”48 
 
The ultimate task of the pluralist is to show how apparently inconsistent religious beliefs are 
indeed consistent while also providing a unifying account of the diversity of religious belief. 
This account needs to both explain the existence of competing religious beliefs and be 
compatible with other constructions of religious understanding.49 For many of Hick’s critics 
this is something that he simply fails to do. Pluralism as a form of exclusivism is a topic we 
will explore in more depth with Gavin D’Costa in Part 2.2 but an introduction of the issue 
here will hopefully develop a familiarity useful for subsequent discourse. Pluralistic theories, 
not only Hick’s, are expounded as being theories motivated by a pragmatic approach to 
explaining how multiple religions exist. Further, a preference is developed for the practice of 
compassion towards others, a tenet of most religious traditions. This emphasis can lead to 
                                                        
45 Stinnett, Hick’s Pluralistic Theory, p573. 
46 Stinnett, Hick’s Pluralistic Theory, p574. 
47 Stinnett, Hick’s Pluralistic Theory, p574. 
48 Aikin, Scott F., and Jason Aleksander. 2012. "Nicholas Of Cusa’S De Pace Fidei And The Meta-Exclusivism Of 
Religious Pluralism". International Journal For Philosophy Of Religion 74 (2): p228. 
49 Aikin and Aleksander, Meta-Exclusivism, p231. 
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the dampening of the doctrinal or epistemological demands that any of those traditions 
may require of its adherents.50 This prescriptive element is what critiques rely on to draw 
attention to the exclusivist foundations of pluralism.  
 
For critics, this is pluralism’s fundamental weakness. They are unable to bear their practical 
commitments to toleration of religious difference because of this preference for a specific 
part of religious traditions.51 It is a noble part to be sure; but it is not the concept specifically 
which is the cause of the issue but the preference for that concept and the problems that 
preference causes for the pluralist. Whilst Hick promotes the second-order nature of his 
pluralism, it is still a form of exclusivism in that second-order. It is possible to assert that two 
apparently inconsistent religions are indeed both true. This is achieved in the revision of 
those traditions through the lens of pluralism; which at this point essentially becomes a 
third theology that supervenes on the previous two.52  
The issue of compatibility between religious belief and pluralism is in the dissonance 
between the first order commitment of the religious believer and the second order 
commitment of the pluralist. The exclusive nature of the second order belief that all 
religions are valid reactions to the singular ultimate Real runs in direct contradiction to the 
assertion of many religious traditions that they themselves are the singular reaction to their 
singular ultimate Real. The irony is that a pluralist theory of religious diversity is 
incompatible not only with the views of inclusivists and exclusivists, but also with other 
pluralists.  
 
Scott F. Aikin and Jason Aleksander offer in their paper Nicholas of Cusa’s De Pace Fidei and 
the Meta-Exclusivism of Religious Pluralism a similar concern. The number of traditions that 
Hick designates as possible religions is such a broad one, assuming a practice of tolerance 
becomes radically thin in order to accommodate the extreme amount of diversity.53 A 
Hickian response to this would be that his pluralism makes efforts to reduce the scope of 
this category. To maintain that Hick refers to accommodating all religions is a 
misunderstanding of the pluralist stance. Hick sets out clear conditions for the delineation 
between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ religions. Namely, those religions which are right are those who 
guide their adherents from a self-centred to a reality-centred orientation.  
 
A concern from Aikin and Aleksander which I do believe to have a staying impact on Hick’s 
pluralism however is the question regarding the efficacy of pushing ethico-political 
objectives within a theological framework. The central need for tolerance may more likely 
be achievable outside of a specific theology.54 It seems that the pluralist approach to 
resolving conflict is: 
 
“…achieved by liberalizing their theologies instead of finding independent reasons to 
liberalize their politics. [Why not] provide a political justification for religious concord 
than… provide a theological justification for peaceful politics.”55 
                                                        
50 Aikin and Aleksander, Meta-Exclusivism, p220. 
51 Aikin and Aleksander, Meta-Exclusivism, p221. 
52 Aikin and Aleksander, Meta-Exclusivism, p228. 
53 Aikin and Aleksander, Meta-Exclusivism, p232. 
54 Aikin and Aleksander, Meta-Exclusivism, p234. 
55 Aikin and Aleksander, Meta-Exclusivism, p234. 
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Part 2.2 Owen Anderson and Questionable Presuppositions  
When taken to their logical end point do the presuppositions within Hick’s pluralism actually 
count against him? 
 
In his paper The Presuppositions of Religious Pluralism and the Need for Natural Theology 
Owen Anderson takes a distinct approach to his examination of the pluralist’s stance. His 
engagement with Hick’s pluralism is two-fold. The first half of the article asserts four 
primary presuppositions of Hick’s theory. The second half takes those same 
presuppositions, extends them to their logical end point, and then uses these conclusions to 
pivot away from Hick’s pluralism in favour of his own form of rational exclusivism. In other 
words, a strategic reaffirmation which transitions to a refutation using the same core 
principles. These presuppositions are the following: 
 
 i.) The ought/can principle 
 ii.) The universality of religious experience 
 iii.) The universality of redemptive change 
 iv.) A view of how the Eternal would do things56 
 
The ought/can principle is the relationship between what is required of a person versus that 
person’s ability. If a person ought to do something then they must be capable of doing it; if 
a person cannot do something they cannot be required to do it.57 Anderson provides 
Christianity as an example. If the Christian salvation is the only salvation then this is an 
unfair demand because not every person that has ever been or will be has been present 
during the time that Christianity has been a doctrine. Those people cannot be required to 
subscribe to a doctrine that never existed. This relates specifically to Hick’s pluralism in that 
achieving salvation is something that all people ought to achieve. This salvation therefore 
cannot be restricted to one religion because the temporal and geographical restrictions of 
that religion would mean the inability for the majority of people to achieve salvation.  
 
Hick’s pluralism is one of ambiguity. If more than one religion is capable of providing 
salvation, then a level of ambiguity is placed on the devotion to those religions. There is no 
motivating reason for a person to select one or the other or the other. This ambiguity for 
Anderson is a violation of the ought/can principle.58 If religious devotion is simply a case of 
proximity then the burden of what a person is capable of no longer resides with them but 
rather with a random assignment of a temporal and geographical location. And this 
assignment does make a difference. Most post-axial religions look different to how we 
believe them to have first started, to say nothing of the intra-religious schisms that all 
possess.  
 
The second presupposition is the universality of religious experience. For Hick this 
experience is that of the transcendent Real and therefore not limited to those of one 
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religion. For Hick what unifies all people, regardless of the nature of any one person’s 
specific experience, is that the experience exists in the first place. The import is placed 
therefore on the religious experience itself rather than how the experience manifests. For 
Anderson this presupposition relies on a preference that is based on a circular argument. 
Pluralism values a religious interpretation of religious experience over a naturalistic one. 
This preference requires knowledge that the transcendental Real exists. This knowledge 
cannot be based on religious experience otherwise it defaults to circularity.59 For Anderson 
the issue isn’t the universality of religious experience but the preference for religious 
interpretation which makes that universality possible.   
 
The third and fourth presuppositions are interrelated. Redemptive change is the core of all 
post-axial religions and the specific view of how the Eternal would do things. Briefly, whilst 
‘do things’ implies a personae interpretation of the Real, this can be interchanged with an 
impersonae interpretation like “how the Eternal would be in alignment with or reflective 
of”. I think Anderson uses the personae interpretation here because he is alluding to Hick’s 
Christian background in the formation of his pluralism. Subsequently, the specific view of 
how the Eternal would do things for Hick is the belief that God is loving and therefore God 
must behave in a way that is in alignment with that loving nature.60 Again, Anderson takes 
issue with the liberties that Hick takes with defining the nature of the transcendent Real. 
Naturally the characteristic of loving would be high on the lists of the majority of Christians 
but another relatively popular characteristic is justness. From this, questions regarding the 
demands of love and justice and whether they can always be reconciled and pulled into 
alignment arise. To say God is loving is to rely on one aspect whilst ignoring others.61  
 
However, here there is an issue of Anderson taking the presuppositions of Hick’s pluralism 
and treating them as the concrete foundations of a theology, instead of a cautious 
hypothesis for why the world is as religiously diverse as it is. Hick has never asserted that his 
pluralism is specifically the correct way of viewing the world; rather, it is a proffering of the 
most likely explanation. This means that to critique these four core presuppositions for 
being exactly that, presuppositions, is simply stating that which has already been said by 
Hick himself. The underlying issues that Anderson draws attention to in his critique are 
worth exploring, and will be explored in the following segments. But to be presented with a 
sand castle and then to simply criticise it for not using a steel framework misses the point of 
its construction. 
 
Part 2.3: Gavin D’Costa on Criteria and Agnosticism  
A religious pluralist, whilst maintaining that all religions are distinct reactions to the 
Transcendental Real, only passively rejects alternative theories of religious diversity 
 
An issue that Gavin D’Costa, like many, has taken with Hick’s pluralism is how it seems to 
operate from the same position as most theories of exclusivism. For pluralism to work there 
must be a proposed schemata for how religious diversity could exist considering the 
exclusivist claims made by many of those religions. This schemata has a proposed criteria for 
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how to understand the relationship between different religions, as well as the relationship 
between those religions and the transcendental Real they believe to be responding to. If an 
understanding of religion or religious diversity were to differ from this criteria then it would 
be considered false. In drawing the line between what is a true understanding and what is a 
false understanding, the pluralist becomes an exclusivist.62 
 
What does this mean specifically for Hick’s pluralism? Hick’s particular schemata is based on 
a religion’s ability to re-orientate its adherents from a self-centred view of the world to a 
reality-centred one. If this is the religion’s main objective then they are true. A religion is 
considered false in their belief if they claim a final or ultimate knowledge in the 
transcendent Real and by extension condemn the claims of other religions in light of their 
own alethic superiority.63 The justification for the criterion itself is what Hick terms a basic 
moral insight based on The Golden Rule. It stems from the basic moral consensus of all 
popular post-axial religious traditions.64 
 
Conversely, D’Costa’s interpretation of this criteria is that it is grounded in Hick’s assertion 
that a loving God who desires the salvation of all human beings would only allow a world in 
which it was possible for all human beings to gain said salvation.65 This particular 
observation is unfounded specifically because it doesn’t acknowledge the evolution that 
Hick went through personally as a philosopher and therefore, by extension, his theory of 
religious pluralism. D’Costa gives reference to God and the Universe of Faiths and Death and 
Eternal Life, published in ’73 and ’76 respectively, and An Interpretation of Religion, first 
published in ’89; all apparently supporting his interpretation of Hick’s theory. In those 
thirteen years Hick abandoned the evangelical basis of his pluralism for a harder reliance on 
Kant’s phenomenal/noumenal distinction and none of that evangelical basis is mentioned in 
Interpretation. So whilst it was true that at one point Hick’s theory was reliant on a 
particular image of God, that was no longer the case by the time Interpretation was 
published. 
 
Hick concedes that religious pluralists do maintain a criteria; namely, for what constitutes a 
religion. This criterion is whether a tradition exemplifies the salvific effort of re-orientating 
its adherents from a self-centred experience of the world to a new reality-centred 
experience with the Transcendent Real as its focus.66 Hick’s response to D’Costa in this 
regard is that the use of a criteria as indicative of exclusivism is a slippery slope. If this claim 
is to be followed then: 
 
“In this trivial and misleading sense one is an exclusivist when one admires Mahatma 
Gandhi and the Dalai Lama but condemns Hitler and Stalin; or when an umpire 
declares a foul in football; or even when one distinguishes between left and right, or 
night and day, or makes such an innocent statement as that it is raining! For to make 
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an assertion about anything is to deny its contrary, and to propose a theory or view 
about anything is to reject alternative views.”67 [emphasis in non-italics added] 
 
Now there is an issue with Hick’s response: in defending his criteria he moves into a 
different category of examples in order to justify his own theory. The delineation between 
the Dalai Lama and Hitler, between offside and not offside and between night and day are 
all easily made (some referees notwithstanding). This is because of the empirical physical 
evidence that we can use to clarify those delineations. Religious traditions whilst manifestly 
physical are also concerned with the metaphysical. Evidencing a delineation is a more 
complex task. However, this complexity is not found in simply asserting that pluralism is a 
form of exclusivism. 
    
Where complexity can be claimed and therefore a line between pluralism and exclusivism 
also, is in how the two theories are asserted. Naturally, Hick is correct in that any assertion 
is an implicit denial of the contrary. This rejection however, can be active or passive. An 
active rejection is one in which the rejection of the alternative is a core component of the 
assertion itself. A passive rejection is therefore one in which the denial of the alternative is a 
by-product of the original claim. So, in this instance an essential trait of the religious 
exclusivist is not only that their religion is the one true way but that all others are wrong. 
Alternatively, a religious pluralist, whilst maintaining that all religions are distinct reactions 
to the Transcendental Real, only passively rejects alternative theories of religious diversity. 
 
This is reaffirmed by Hick himself later in his reply to D’Costa when he makes his own 
distinction between religious exclusivism and pluralism. Namely, the two theories have two 
separate logical foundations: the former is a self-committing affirmation of faith with the 
latter being a philosophical hypothesis.68 A suitable addendum to this would be that whilst 
religious pluralism is a philosophical hypothesis, Hick’s pluralism has some of its foundations 
in his own religiosity and so therefore is not quite as distant as he would claim. 
Nevertheless, pluralism, by Hick’s definition, is not another historically placed religious 
tradition asserting its singular dominance but a theory about the relationship between 
those traditions. 
 
With these complexities of delineating between pluralism and exclusivism we now turn to 
another point of contention - Hick’s adoption of Kant’s delineation. The 
phenomenal/noumenal distinction that Hick adopts creates an attitude D’Costa coins 
transcendental agnosticism.69 That is, that one cannot know the true nature of the 
transcendental Real, only that there is indeed a truth beyond one’s understanding. This 
component of Hick’s religious pluralism is itself a weighty assertion, and one which D’Costa 
questions. In order for his theory to work Hick must know this characteristic of ineffability to 
be true. Hick’s response is that he doesn’t. Religious pluralism, whilst comprehensive, is 
nonetheless still only a hypothesis, a  theory which attempts to explain not only the 
religious diversity present in the world but how different religions seem to be equally 
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effective, and sometimes ineffective, paths to the salvific reorientation of human 
experience.70 
 
Nonetheless, in making this distinction Hick asserts that no one phenomenal interpretation 
of the transcendent Real is any more correct than another. This has consequences for Hick 
as his own interpretation of the noumenal transcendental Real, his pluralism, could be 
construed as just another phenomenal one among many with no prominence to assert. 
Therefore his assertion, while not as prominent as in his early work, that the Real is all 
loving and desires salvation for all individuals, becomes no more true than the Real being an 
ultimate state in which the ego dissolves utterly and pure consciousness is manifested.  
 
For D’Costa this means that in Hick’s leveling of the playing field, both interpretations 
relinquish any cognitive purchase. Instead they can only be considered useful in their ability 
to shape attitudes and behaviours which lead to a salvific orientation. So when it comes to 
ontological claims concerning the transcendental Real, agnosticism is the only viable 
option.71 To come full circle, this apparent need for transcendental agnosticism within Hick’s 
pluralism only goes to further the argument that the theory is itself a form of exclusivism. 
Any view or understanding that runs in contradiction to this agnosticism is considered false. 
For example, if the agnostic approach is that the noumenal Real cannot be known but a 
religion claims to have the true transcendental Real revealed within its tradition then those 
claims are false.72 These claims are subsequently labelled as mythical; not literally true but 
containing an educational significance; an assertion that many religious adherents would 
claim contradicts their own self-understanding.  
 
Part 2.4: Kvanvig and the Pluralist’s Religious Quandary 
In order for a pluralist to be a true religious adherent, their pluralism has to be left behind 
 
In his article Religious Pluralism and The Buridan’s Ass Paradox, Jonathan L. Kvanvig 
examines whether or not it is possible for an individual to hold both a pluralist stance and 
religious beliefs. He does this by co-opting John Buridan’s eponymous conundrum.  
The Buridan’s Ass Paradox presents a hungry donkey set before two seemingly 
identical bales of hay, each equidistant. The paradox is in how to explain why the donkey 
may choose one bale over the other. This parallels Kvanvig’s primary concern with Hick’s 
pluralism: If more than one religion offers an equally salvific path why would an individual 
choose the Buddhist Bale over the Christian Bale?  
 
For Kvanvig it is a matter of classifying the rationality of actions. He offers the categories of 
rational, irrational, and non-rational. Where most would only deem the first two necessary, 
Kvanvig includes the third so that arbitrary actions aren’t given the same status as those 
actions easily placed within the rational category.73 Here arbitrary actions are those in which 
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no reason can be found for the preference of one option over another. This third category is 
where Buridan’s ass and Kvanvig’s religious individual reside.  
 
A natural reaction to this initial comparison is the false equivalency drawn between the 
situation the donkey finds itself in compared to the individual and their desire to become a 
religious adherent. The choice presented to the donkey is not the same choice placed in 
front of the individual. Becoming an adherent of any religion requires more than just 
choosing to say particular words or perform particular actions. A quintessential component 
of any religious tradition is the cognitive commitment to that tradition; a commitment to 
the truth that it presents.74 Once this component of cognitive commitment is 
acknowledged, the language of choice is no longer properly representative of the individual 
and their religious quandary. This is explained in Kvanvig’s scenario: 
 
“I am sitting in a coffee shop and look up, and come to the view that my friend 
Robert has just arrived. To say that I  looked up, considered the possibilities and chose 
to view the situation as one involving Robert’s presence is thoroughly wrongheaded. 
In this case, no choice of any sort was involved. Instead, the belief resulted because 
of perception, and the process involved is of a general causal sort. Any reconstruction 
in terms of the language of choice would be mistaken.”75 
 
So whilst Hick’s theory is one which values both the interactive and reactive aspects of 
religious experience, most religious traditions through both interacting and reacting with 
the noumenal Real have reached an internal consensus and established dogma. This dogma 
then combines its religious tradition’s alethic and salvific adequacy to the extent that in 
order for an adherent to receive salvation they must accept that tradition and its teachings 
as irrevocably true. 
 
This isn’t necessarily an issue for all individuals facing this religious quandary. For some, it 
may just be a case of making a cognitive commitment to a particular religious tradition and 
being open to the interactive and reactive journey that that commitment entails. Not so 
paradoxical. The average individual is not of concern to Kvanvig; rather, it is the pluralist 
that is the ass. In other words, how can someone in Hick’s shoes maintain both a pluralist 
stance on religious diversity and make a cognitive commitment to the irrevocable truth of 
one religious tradition and resolve their religious quandary?76 If anything, the pluralist is in 
even deeper trouble than the donkey. To stop from starving, the donkey need only make 
the decision of which bale to eat from irrespective of whether ultimately that decision is 
rational, irrational or nonrational. It seems that the pluralist needs to do more than this to 
commit to a particular religious tradition.  
 
Fortunately, Kvanvig’s paper performs the role of both call and response. His answer is the 
addition of another form of cognitive interaction. If choosing is not enough and believing 
compromises the pluralist stance then perhaps acceptance is an avenue worth exploring.77 
Here, to accept a proposition is to assent to the truth of the proposition. Through this 
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understanding, cognitive commitments are not comprised of beliefs but of acceptances. An 
issue being that most religious language uses and teaches on the concept of belief, but this 
can be equated to a misdiagnosis; when an adherent says they believe in the Christian God 
they mean they accept the Christian God. Admittedly, this is slightly revisionist, but only in 
the realignment of a concept, better than a radical shift in self-understanding.   
 
Shifting from belief to acceptance as the basis for cognitive commitment is a pluralist 
response because it reflects the balance between interaction and reaction. It makes 
cognitive commitment more voluntary than if characterised by belief. This voluntary nature 
is what realigns the pluralist and their religious quandary with the hungry donkey. If 
acceptance is the key to commitment then, like the donkey, it is of no ultimate consequence 
what the reason is for the selection, it is a matter of action. As Kvanvig states “one can’t 
have rational beliefs without being in a position to rule out known competing alternatives 
whereas one can have rational actions even in the face of such alternatives”.78 In other 
words, because of the voluntary nature of action that is not present in belief, actions can be 
arbitrary in a way that beliefs cannot replicate.  
 
Still, this technically does not solve the religious quandary faced by the pluralist. To accept a 
religious tradition is to accept its teachings and its irrevocable truth. With belief as the 
action indicative of cognitive commitment, religious tradition is the evaluator of truth. With 
acceptance as the cognitive commitment, the individual and the religious tradition together 
are the evaluators of truth. Whichever side you fall on, each of these carry a truth that is 
incompatible with the pluralist understanding of religious diversity. For Kvanvig, pluralism is 
simply not portable. In order to take a step towards a religious bale, one’s pluralism has to 
be left behind. So Kvanvig’s transition from belief to acceptance is not a pluralist solution to 
the pluralist’s religious quandary but a way of avoiding the quandary by abandoning the 
part of the equation which makes it impossible.79 Hick touches on this issue in a reply to a 
similar complaint lodged by Kevin Meeker. For him it is possible to be an adherent of a 
religious tradition whilst also maintaining a pluralist stance. The former is a first-order 
confession of adherence to a particular religious tradition with the latter being a second-
order philosophy concerning the coexistence of the different forms of religious belief 
present in each religious tradition.80 Whether or not this would satisfy Kvanvig is for another 
time and thesis. 
 
PART 3: Alternatives to Hick’s Pluralism 
 
Up until this point this section has nearly exclusively dealt with Hick and his critics. Now we 
turn to some alternative forms of pluralism. Namely, contributions from Seyed Hassan 
Hosseini, Xin Mao and Peter Byrne. For anyone who has read around the discourse 
concerning pluralism this list has some glaring omissions. Notable theologians like Paul 
Knitter or George Lindbeck have made seismic semantic contributions to the field. The three 
contributions have been selected firstly because of how they stand in contrast to Hick’s 
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theory and secondly the opportunity for a refinement of Hick’s pluralism that such a 
juxtaposition provides. 
 
Part 3.1 Seyed Hassan Hosseini and Truthful Pluralism 
The important distinction between a philosophy of religion and a theology of religion. 
 
Hosseini’s issue with Hick is that the importance of religious language that Hick’s theory 
promotes is incongruent with the theory’s implication that the same language is 
meaningless; considering the religious statements of which it is comprised are “human 
products of experience-based perceptions”.81 In response to this, Hosseini’s own pluralism is 
one in which the truthfulness or alethic validity of each form of religious expression is 
maintained whilst also accounting for the diversity of those expressions. Essentially:  
  
“Religion is considered as the unique nature of the Real, and as the Real manifests 
itself in diverse and real worlds, the uniqueness of religion is also instantiated in 
different forms of faiths and revelations.”82 
 
If we were to maintain Hick’s phenomenal/noumenal distinction what Hosseini does is take 
the noumenal Real and deny, in one sense, its ineffability. An ultimate divine reality which 
supervenes different equally divine manifestations. With Hosseini’s theory the diverse range 
of religious expression is accounted for whilst maintaining the self-understanding of 
truthfulness that each tradition holds. This maintaining of truthfulness is what allows 
religious statements to be cognitively meaningful and not just metaphors or symbols.  
  
With Hosseini’s pluralism, the Real is not an ineffable divine nor is religion simply a human 
reaction to that presence. The Real is absolutely real and present in the world in a myriad of 
ways, with each religion a true manifestation of that Real. Within any of the many 
manifestations of this absolute there is the opportunity for determinations of the Real to 
appear. This is the Qur’an in Islam, Jesus in Christianity or the Buddha in Buddhism. Each of 
these appear as the absolute Real without being specifically the absolute Real.83 
 
This is an unclear distinction. It seems that Hosseini has created a distinction between two 
forms of noumenal reality; the noumenal Real and a sub-noumenal Real. The Real as 
absolute exists and is equally manifested in the world’s religions. This is an attempt to 
preserve the self-understanding of each religious tradition. Hosseini does this by 
maintaining each tradition’s own truth while adding a supervening truth. 
 
Here religious experience exists in what Hosseini calls ‘a particular spiritual universe’ and its 
origin is of the Real rather than human.84 This theory maintains the truthful uniqueness of 
religion as well as its diversity in the parsing of the noumenal and sub-noumenal. The Real 
as a relative absolute: 
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“As the Real manifests itself in different forms, and since religion under this 
assumption is perfectly divine, all religions are considered diverse crystallizations of 
the ultimate divine religion, and consequently, the uniqueness of Religion and the 
plurality of faiths are not only contrary, but also integral to each other, since diversity 
is intended and willed by God.”85 
 
There are problems with this particular brand of pluralism. Firstly, Hosseini’s issue with 
metaphors and symbols betrays the importance we as a global society place on literal 
language over metaphorical language. Certainly, literal language is easier and therefore 
perhaps more appropriate to use in many situations. However when we start to talk of 
things that are not solely of a physical nature we need language that can not only represent 
but reflect those things. More on this in Section III: Metaphor. The second problem of this 
pluralism is the theological foundations upon which it is built. Hick’s pluralism is one 
undeniably informed by his own Christianity. However it acknowledges the interaction 
between the mundane and the divine, between the human and the Real.  
 
In the above quote from Hosseini the will of God is mentioned, and this is not the only time 
it is referred to in the article; in fact, it appears quite frequently. So whilst Hosseini is 
employing philosophical language there is an issue of what field these theories exist in. 
Hick’s pluralism is a self-confessed religious philosophy of religion; Hosseini’s pluralism is a 
theology of a multiplely-manifested religion.   
 
Part 3.2 Xin Mao and Other-Centredness 
Making a slight alteration to Hick’s terminology and the improvement it represents 
  
Another departure from Hick’s pluralism is found in Xin Mao’s application of the philosophy 
of Emmanuel Levinas. Specifically, the synthesis that Mao achieves in taking the centrality of 
ethics characteristic of a ‘levinasian’ approach and framing it within Hick’s salvation 
schemata. In replacing a core component of Hick’s version of salvation; of turning from self-
centredness to reality-centredness, Mao calls for a transformation of self-centredness to 
other-centredness. As Mao states, the goal is that “messianic peace would take the place of 
ultimate Reality as the teleological value underpinning religious pluralism”.86 
 
In going about such a replacement the first step is to recognise what already exists in Hick’s 
theory. There is already a strong element of ethics in Hick’s form of salvation. The salvific 
event of an individual becoming reality-centred is one characterised by a greater care and 
investment in not only their own life but equally or even more so in the lives of others and 
the universe at large. In moving away from reality-centredness to other-centredness Mao 
shifts the focus away from questions regarding the nature of an ultimate Real, instead 
placing it in how individuals treat each other in the first meaning of ‘other’ as well as 
investment in the metaphysical other, the second meaning.87  
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This transition towards otherness means that salvation would not necessarily lead towards 
the noumenal Real but to what Levinas termed ‘messianic peace’.88   
 
Traditionally Hick’s re-orientation towards reality-centredness seems to intrinsically carry 
more theological weight than simple other-centredness. Here Mao asserts an emphasis has 
to be placed on the opportunity for infinite transcendence in the re-orientation towards the 
other. Specifically, the introduction of the other as a transcendent concept with a 
quintessential ethical component.89 In other words, the metaphysical second meaning of 
the term otherness. This is not an entirely alien concept; branches of mysticism in different 
religious traditions have presented concepts regarding divine otherness.  
 
Hick’s pluralism has one of its foundations in a particular type of soteriological journey - the 
re-orientation towards the Real. Whilst this journey is one which fits the mould of many 
religious traditions it is still a singular prescriptive articulation of salvation. Thus it runs the 
risk, like other aspects of Hick’s theory, of being criticised for its implied exclusivism. Replies 
to this critique have been voiced in previous parts of this section but it is included here also 
because the development of Mao’s salvation is in part a response to this critique.   
 
In the modern world, information about other religious traditions is easily accessible, with 
not only practices but scriptures being documented and translated. However, religious 
conflict persists. This persistence is due to a myriad of factors, but if the salvific nature of 
multiple religious traditions is concerned with the re-orientation of its adherents towards 
reality-centredness then it begs the question why conflict continues to be such an issue. 
Mao’s answer is if peace is simply a consequence or by-product of achieving salvation then 
its immediate need is not recognised.90 
 
What Mao’s ethical salvation entails is the immediacy in the valuing of the other. If the 
journey is from self-centredness to other-centredness then the individual must recognise 
and value the other early in their journey of religious adherence; compassion is not only 
fostered within but also between individuals. This is the messianic peace to which Levinas 
was referring and the same peace that may come too late in Hick’s pluralism.    
 
Part 3.3 Peter Byrne and Tolerant Pluralism 
Shifting from diversity-as-problem-to-be-solved to diversity-as-difference-to-be-valued 
 
Byrne’s tolerant pluralism was born out of the question of whether religious individuals can 
be tolerant and hold pluralist views all the while maintaining a devout commitment to the 
truth of their own religious beliefs.91 If this is not possible then it seems a religious individual 
must revise their commitment in order to become more truly tolerant of others. Byrne’s 
pluralism focuses on tolerance because unlike Hick, his pluralism is one which emphasises 
the true difference in religious belief. These theories have different methods because they 
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are achieving different goals. Hick’s theory and its noumenal Real is an accounting for the 
metaphysics of religious diversity. Byrne’s theory and its emphasis on tolerance is a way to 
navigate the pragmatics of religious diversity. Time has already been spent on the general 
tenets of pluralism as well as religious belief; because of this the following section deals 
with Byrne’s tolerance and the issues it presents.  
 
Six factors have to be present in order for tolerance to occur: difference, importance, 
opposition, power, non-interference and requirement.92 For the sake of brevity we will be 
exploring importance, opposition and non-interference. Importance is the difference 
between the tolerator and the tolerated being treated as non-trivial, at least to the 
tolerator. Opposition is that the point of difference is one which the tolerator does not 
approve of. Non-interference is that the tolerator does not interfere with the tolerated or 
alter the point of difference.93 
 
Once an understanding of these tenets is established, Byrne examines them in closer details 
and finds issues with their co-dependent structure. When understood to be working in 
conjunction it seems that importance and opposition are factors which entail that an 
individual can only tolerate that which they do not approve of. This disapproval is 
tantamount to the belief that the tolerated is objectively wrong or mistaken in their 
particular belief or practice. If this logic is held alongside the factor of non-interference it 
seems to Byrne that we are presented with a paradox. If a tolerator believes a behaviour to 
be objectively wrong and therefore better to not exist than exist then surely it is not only 
upon the tolerator to interfere with that behaviour but they would be justified in doing so.94 
The answer to this paradox is in the recognition of the autonomy of other individuals 
as an equally important value. The value of autonomy is not worth compromising in order to 
rectify a perceived opposition in a point of difference.95  
 
This line of questioning regarding the paradox of toleration can be dismissed entirely. Just 
because a tolerator deems a point of contention to be an opposition of import does not 
entail that the tolerator is objective in their judgement. Therefore, they are not necessitated 
to interfere with the point of contention. In some cases, this could be argued. For example 
when one places toleration into a religious context this shift from objective to subjective is 
not so easy. Specifically because, as Hick has faced with his own pluralism, many a religious 
tolerator believes themselves to be objectively on the correct side of the point of 
contention. To convince a religious individual that this objectivity was indeed subjective is 
again to require revision of the individuals beliefs. As Byrne states: 
 
“Both religious pluralists and tolerant pluralists do more than simply accept, without 
active opposition, the divergent religious beliefs of others. Both will welcome and 
encourage the expression of religious difference. Both will be interested in learning 
about the beliefs of others. But note that it is only the tolerant pluralist who will see 
in the different religious beliefs of others the occasion to re-examine her own. The 
beliefs of religious others (excluding the beliefs of the non-religious) cannot challenge 
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those of the religious pluralist, for there is no opposition between the beliefs of 
religions covered by a pluralist hypothesis.”96 
 
The diversity of belief is acknowledged in religious pluralism but the metaphysical conflict of 
these beliefs is assuaged by the ultimacy of the noumenal Real. Tolerant pluralism 
alternatively acknowledges less the co-existence but more the co-conflict of religious belief. 
This point of difference between religious adherents is not just an alethic issue but an 
opportunity for deep self-reflection. It is a re-orientation from diversity-as-problem-to-be-
solved to diversity-as-difference-to-be-valued. This isn’t to say that Hick didn’t value the 
learning opportunities provided by the difference in religious belief; his study of the world’s 
religious traditions is evidence of the contrary. Nor are pluralists in general incapable of 
meaningfully engaging with multiple religious traditions. However, the primary aim for 
Hick’s religious pluralism, as has been stated before, is to account for the diversity of 
religious belief and tradition; and within this theory there is a subliminal dismissiveness. If, 
for the sake of simplicity, we say all religions are equally salvific then there is little incentive 
for a religious individual to meaningfully engage outside their lane. Not an intentional 




Hick’s work in The Interpretation of Religion is comprehensive. In it his pluralist hypothesis is 
given foundational evidence from various disciplines and his own summation of the world’s 
religious diversity. The two pillars of the noumenal/phenomenal distinction and the primary 
soteriological concern of the post-axial religions are strong insofar as they more or less 
reflect the relationship between religious adherents and their religious tradition. However, 
as we have explored, there are shortcomings to Hick’s pluralism that are difficult to 
categorically resolve.  
 
Hick makes a point of asserting his pluralism is a hypothesis; a description of the data placed 
before him. This is not completely true because at times Hick’s pluralism slips into 
prescriptivism through the way in which the theory requires most religious adherents to 
alter their self-understanding to comply. Admittedly, there is nothing essentially wrong with 
prescriptivism in this context; it is the moving between this and descriptivism whilst only 
claiming the latter that becomes problematic.  
 
Pluralism as a form of exclusivism is a topic we touched on multiple times and whilst Hick’s 
response in the delineation of first and second-order commitments, an element of coercion 
still exists. Even then in our examination of D’Costa criticisms, the issue of transcendental 
agnosticism is a real threat. How a person can make meaningful assertions about the 
transcendental Real or even fully commit to specific religious tradition is complicated by this 
agnosticism supposedly required and yet millions of people continue to do both these 
things. Through Meeker’s discomfort with Hick’s pluralism as an exclusivist we have seen 
the relationship between salvation/liberation and altruistic behaviour; with the latter being 
a consequence of the former and not vice versa.   
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With Eddy and the concern for radical subjectivism we have clarified that in 
emphasising and valuing the contribution of human awareness to the perceiving of the 
phenomenal Real we elevate religious experience above subjectivism. Still, we need to be 
mindful of the limited nature of human awareness when postulating theories of religion. 
With Kvanvig we explored what the Buridan’s paradox means for Hick’s theory and whether 
it is possible to be a religious adherent and a pluralist; perhaps it is, just not Hick’s particular 
brand.  
 
With Hassan we discovered the importance of maintaining parameters around a theory so 
as to not confuse disciplines. Hick’s pluralism is certainly one which relies on inter-
disciplinary study but it is firmly a philosophy of religion. In order to fully account for 
religious diversity it is a philosophy not a theology that has the greatest opportunity to be 
accepted. The levinasian ethics expounded by Mao is a valuable one. If we spend too much 
time looking up we might miss what is around us. Hick’s pluralism is one which appreciates 
this sentiment but it is Mao’s requirement for other-centredness which makes it explicit. By 
extension, as discussed with Byrne, diversity-as-difference-to-be-valued is an important 
assertion. Without this Hick’s pluralism falls back to its descriptivist intentions and leaves 
everything as close to ‘as is’ as possible. Yet tolerance is then expected to be something 
which appears from each religious tradition organically.  
 
There are issues with Hick’s pluralism that are not adequately resolved. Questions regarding 
conflicting truth claims, the need for revision and the soteriological concern are all elements 
that simultaneously are both essential to Hick’s theory and impinge on it. These questions 
should be kept in the back of the mind moving forward. This exploration of Hick’s pluralist 
hypothesis is the first of the two expeditions. The second of these is Section II on the subject 
of metaphor and its role in embodied religious experience. It is in the combining of the 




























The relationship between this section and first is characteristically one of call and response. 
At the end of our exploration of Hick’s pluralism we are left with the need to address the 
weaknesses that we called attention to. My intention in this section is to illustrate how an 
expanded version of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory (CMT) 
synthesises with our version of Hick’s pluralism to provide a platform for the RELICS 
method. We start by first explaining CMT along with the principles and assertions that 
underpin it. We then move on to some of the obstacles CMT faces and the pre-cognitive 
considerations not attested to within the theory itself. Finally we make a cursory 
investigation into the role CMT can play in the philosophy of religion. This investigation with 
the obstacles and pre-cognitive considerations that come before it all point towards the 
need for significant changes to CMT. So that it might both properly reflect the embodied 
experience of the human condition as well as provide a platform from which, alongside our 
condensed pluralism, we build the RELICS method.  
 
While the discourse concerning metaphor dates back to Plato the device became seriously 
considered in the latter half of the 20th century. A hallmark of this period is the lack of a 
clear distinction between metaphor and figurative language; the terms were 
interchangeable. For some this persists with metaphor understood as an umbrella term 
which shelters other phenomena such as analogy, metonymy and synecdoche. For an 
increasing number of people this is too reductive a categorization. Instead, non-literal 
language has become the umbrella term under which the aforementioned phenomena in 
addition to our primary concern, metaphor, is placed. Classically, metaphors were 
considered a device for transferring a set of lexical items from one term to another. Much 
later, metaphors were characterised as being of both language and thought, not simply a 
linguistic device but also cognitive. Now we are within the era of metaphor as conceptual 
phenomena. Metaphors are those things which underpin and form the foundation for our 
conceptual system and therefore guide how we interact with and convey our experienced 
reality. This has meant that instead of providing definitions of metaphor, those participating 
in this scholarship have instead offered theories as to how metaphors work. It is one such 
theory which we turn to now. 
 
PART 4: Lakoff and Johnson’s Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
 
In their seminal book Metaphors We Live By George Lakoff and Mark Johnson propose that 
metaphor is not only central to our language but to our thoughts and actions. Over the 
course of the book they assert that our conceptual system is inherently metaphorical. This 
conceptual system is not only what gives structure to our mental processes but provides 
guides within the functioning of day to day existence. What we experience and how we 
experience is given shape by our conceptual system.97 A concession of the cognitive 
metaphor theory is that we cannot study directly our conceptual system for fear of opting 
into a cyclical process of using our conceptual system to understand our conceptual system. 
We can however, study this system indirectly through examining the language we use and 
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how it is indicative of that system. In other words, the structure of our language is 
emblematic of the structure of our conceptual system. However, Lakoff and Johnson 
maintain that we can see it evidenced in language. Our conceptual system not only 
structures our thoughts but naturally by extension our communication also. This conceptual 
system is composed of conceptual schemata which is in turn comprised of ‘conceptual 
metaphors’. These metaphors are conceptual because they are the foundation for the 
understanding of concepts. For example for the concept of ‘love’ there are a myriad of 
conceptual metaphors, for example:   
 
  LOVE IS WAR  
  She fled from her advances 
  She pursued him relentlessly 
  He won his hand in marriage  
  They are besieged by suitors 
  He enlisted the aid of her friends  
  He made an ally of her mother 
 
These terms are not only used in the way we talk about love but the way we experience 
love. The more parallels, the more fitting a metaphor is the more entrenched that 
conceptual metaphor becomes. This is the reason LOVE IS WAR98 has become so universal 
whilst LOVE IS CROCHET has remained relatively unmined. However, there is no single 
conceptual metaphor for any given concept, indeed the opposite. Conceptual metaphors 
characteristically only provide a particular view, a particular interpretation, of a concept. 
Other conceptual metaphors are equally valuable in the perspective they offer, for instance:   
 
LOVE IS MAGIC  
She cast a spell on me  
The magic is gone  
He was spellbound  
She had me hypnotised  
He has me in a trance  
He was charmed by her 
 
An equally insightful perspective on the concept of love but from and within a completely 
different framing. The way in which we use words, have thoughts and perform actions are 
all informed by conceptual metaphors like these.99 As we move through everyday life we are 
constantly moving between conceptual schemata by utilising our conceptual system. We 
change the conceptual metaphors we use to reflect our embodied experience. To show how 
systematic and pervasive these conceptual metaphors can be consider the following:  
 
  TIME IS MONEY 
  The long queue cost him an hour  
  She invested a lot of time in them 
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  That is how he spends his time 
  She’s living on borrowed time 
  They were charitable with their time 
  He lost a lot of time at the casino100 
 
When we frame the concept of ‘time’ this way we understand it as a valuable commodity, a 
limited resource that we spend in return for something.101 The democratic judiciary system 
has its foundation in this conceptual schematic. If a person commits a crime a debt is owed. 
That person is required to repay their debt by repaying with community service or by 
spending time in a secure facility. This is an example of the ways in which conceptual 
metaphors not only inform expression but guide actions. However, as mentioned 
previously, conceptual metaphors only illumine a particular view, as they highlight some of 
its aspects they equally shadow others. TIME IS MONEY carries a list of entailments; to 
spend time wisely, to not waste other people’s time and to be productive with our own. If 
we switch to a different conceptual metaphor, we change the way we conceive of time and 
therefore create a new list of entailments. TIME IS A RIVER entails that time flows in a 
particular direction, perhaps that every moment is different or that it is not lifeless like 
currency but dynamic like water. The plurality of conceptual metaphors is a core principle 
we will utilise in the RELICS method. 
   
Part 4.1 The Ontology of Metaphor 
A clarification on the best way to conceptualise metaphor and its relevance 
 
For a considerable amount of time metaphor was considered a linguistic device; this 
attitude has since shifted and now metaphor has been posited with increasing frequency as 
a cognitive mechanism. The benefit of such a shift comes with a new ability to frame 
metaphor not only within the system of language but also in images, sounds and 
gestures.102 As previously discussed Cognitive Metaphor Theory holds that metaphorical 
thought is based in bodily experience, and that irrespective of the myriad knowledge 
domains and available mapping relationships, all of these are rooted in our immediate 
interactions with the environment. The most basic of these mapping relationships - image-
schemata - are the foundations of metaphorical thought.  
This section does assume a side in the debate on the ontology of metaphor. Broadly 
speaking, the debate is between cognitive linguists and relevance theorists, with the former 
asserting that metaphor is a matter of thought and the latter maintaining its foundation is in 
language use. The central role embodied experience plays in conceptual metaphor theory is 
why the cognitive linguistic approach is the position explored here. However, we will see in 
the closing segments of this section how this approach can adopt some aspects of relevance 
theoretics.  
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Within cognitive linguistics the understanding is that the working on or with metaphor is 
speculative in nature; that it is possible to talk of metaphor in a relatively detached manner. 
The second is conversely its opposite wherein metaphor is a performative constant of active 
thought. These two positions cannot be left simply as opposing alternatives because their 
central theses are central to the ontology of metaphor. The deeper issue, as Clive Cazeaux 
frames it, is that: 
 
“…neither can an impartial philosophical appraisal of the most cogent or defensible 
theory be made, since the status and conduct of philosophy are part of the problem.” 
103 
 
The following writing will deal first with unpacking these opposing views before moving 
onto how we might dissolve the seemingly unresolvable. Metaphor now is considered not 
solely a poetic device of literature but as a process of cross domain mapping which is 
fundamental to our lives of active thought. Cazeaux’s enquiry into metaphor is concerned 
with the ramifications of such an assertion, including the consequences of framing 
metaphor as a fundamental aspect of human life and whether or not the only way to speak 
about metaphor is metaphorically. 104 
 
Lakoff and Johnson’s view is that metaphor is very much integral to the way in which we 
interact with our reality because metaphors are the concepts which mould and guide our 
everyday actions. In their view, our bodily experience of our reality forms the basis for 
conceptual metaphors in which the metaphor acts as a conduit connecting our known 
bodily experience to the thinking and perceiving of concepts beyond that experience. 
Therefore, metaphor is a translative tool by which abstract possibilities become immediate 
bodily realities.105 Lakoff and Johnson are able to refer to metaphor and make claims about 
the mechanism because, from their perspective, this speculative or scientific discourse is 
one which stands apart from the phenomena itself and is therefore able to distinguish and 
understand metaphor as a mechanism.106 
On the other side of the argument Derrida holds that it is impossible to conceptualise or talk 
about metaphor without employing metaphor; it is what he calls an ‘intractable 
structure’.107 For him the deconstruction of metaphor cannot be an analytical breakdown of 
the constituent parts because while it may be possible to identify particular processes they 
at all times remain intact in their reconstruction and formation of the critic’s own views.108 
Though not a word that he uses, it seems that for Derrida, metaphors are fractal in nature, 
meaning that when attempting to analyse a part of metaphor one finds that part to be as 
equally metaphorical as the whole. This is not to say that the analysis of metaphor is a futile 
endeavour, but it is important to recognise the parameters within which it operates. These 
are two views with two fundamentally different approaches.  
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So, how to proceed? Whilst appearing to be at conflict over the nature of metaphor, making 
opposing claims on the ontology of metaphor, these theories are operating on different 
planes by virtue of their disciplinary commitments. This becomes an escapable issue when 
we understand that the ontology and discourse are linked. As will be resounded throughout 
this thesis, metaphor, like language, is a subject that will always require the attention of 
multiple disciplines. Whether conducted by the speculative cognitive linguist or the 
performative philosopher of language, the one cannot resolve the other. It is incorrect to 
place these two views as diametric opposites.  
The avenue that this thesis will be taking is one informed by each of these views, though 
skewing towards one. Essentially the work done by Lakoff and Johnson in the area of 
cognitive linguistics is a valuable one, however it is still one housed within the discipline of 
linguistics. With this being a paper on the philosophies of religion and language, to take on 
Lakoff and Johnson’s field as well would require a juggling act that, in the unlikelihood event 
of success, would still detract from the quality of thought of the philosophies. However, 
what we can seek out is the repercussions of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive linguistics for 
the philosophy of language; appropriately, how the contentions made in one domain impact 
another. In a simple reading of Derrida, there is the position that asking questions 
concerning the consequences of a phrase being a metaphor cannot be posited without 
generating a ‘vicious circle’.109 The confinement of this circle only exists if the power of 
discovery that figurative language can provide is not acknowledged. Using figurative 
language in our exploration of metaphor is only problematic if we value the literal over the 
nonliteral, which, as we will explore in further sections, is an inappropriate stance to take. 
Fortunately Cazeaux arrives at a conclusion of sorts and it is this conclusion that we will 
reframe within the context of this paper. 
This middle way would be called a compromise by some; a dodge, or a weak solution. This 
would be an act of mischaracterisation, and one more likely performed by those who 
subscribe to a speculative train of thought. From the position of the performative, the mode 
in which metaphor is understood to be constantly at work, an interweaving of the two 
avenues is the most appropriate way of acknowledging the contesting views without 
requiring the resolution of its conflict. This is how we will proceed. Not aligning with the 
performative method in its contestation of ideas or with the speculative method, but rather, 
with a performative appraisal of this contestation in the aim of learning as much as possible. 
Cazeaux speaks to this:  
“What does belong to philosophy? Maybe a stance of being simultaneously inside, of 
the system, and outside, about the system, is precisely what is required. Isn’t this the 
territory where living metaphor excels, with new metaphors testing our sense of 
what belongs and does not belong to a semantic domain? A sense of belonging is 
intrinsic to thought, judgment and categorization… Metaphor upsets this process. It 
both destabilizes and revives a sense of what can belong: destabilization because it 
combines two concepts which do not customarily go together, and revivification 
because the combination of concepts is an occasion for (depending upon which 
theory one subscribes to) increasing the scope of the concepts semantic fields or 
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reminding us of our creative being-within-language, a creativity which should not 
remain content with established significations and their customary belongings.” 110 
The concept of being-in-language is an acknowledgement that we are not simply beings 
who use language but also “beings whose condition is defined and constructed in 
language”.111 
Part 4.2 Additional Considerations 
“Metaphorical thought is an emerging result of a complex web of dynamic relationships 
between pre-linguistic and socioculturally regulated semiotic systems”112 
Metaphorical linguistic expressions are the evidence for the cognitive metaphorical 
projections which provide the foundation for our language and play an essential part in the 
creation of conceptual systems. These cognitive metaphorical projections are embedded to 
the extent that they inform not only our language but, by natural extension, our very 
thoughts and actions. There is a concern that by focussing on metaphorical linguistic 
expressions as the evidence for these projections that we miss other evidence. Pre-linguistic 
and non-linguistic areas of expression would be valuable areas to explore, especially 
considering the ability of metaphors to capture concepts beyond language. More on this in 
the third part of this section. 
Within their theory, Lakoff and Johnson establish three primary forms of metaphorical 
classifications: orientation, ontological, and structural. All three primary forms are grounded 
in the immediate understanding, provided through our bodies, of three areas of 
comprehension: our bodies, the interaction between those bodies and our physical 
environment, and our intersubjective interactions with others whose foundational 
experience is the same as our own. This embodied experience of the world is what enables 
us to connect two domains within a metaphorical instantiation. This is achieved through the 
topological structures and informational relationships of the source domain, that which is 
grounded in our immediate understanding, being applied to the target domain, usually, but 
not exclusively, an abstraction.  
Part 4.3 Invariance Principle 
Even if a metaphor is considered successful, it can never elucidate the complete picture of 
the concept 
Originally proposed by Lakoff and Turner in their More Than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to 
Poetic Metaphor, this unidirectional mapping from source to target domain is called the 
invariance principle. The cross domain mapping which occurs in metaphorical instantiations 
takes into account the associative networks of the two concepts. These networks are each 
comprised of lexical items. When a cross domain mapping occurs, the lexical items that 
once were conventional solely within one domain become not so within the metaphorical 
instantiation. Those which are conventional enjoy an easy correlative spot on the new 
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topography. These are the mappings which come to mind first and don’t require effort. 
Conversely, the unconventional lexical items are those which might not necessarily come 
straight to mind but are nonetheless able to be mapped to the new topography as long as 
they don’t conflict with that which has already been conventionally mapped. 
Take for example the conceptual metaphor of LOVE IS A PHYSICAL FORCE. With this 
metaphor our comprehension of LOVE is invited to be understood in terms of a PHYSICAL 
FORCE. The evidence being in phrases such as “His life revolves around him”, “They 
gravitated towards each other immediately”, and “Unfortunately, they just lost their 
momentum”. From the perspective of CMT, the inverse is not viable. When cross domain 
mapping occurs the lexical items of both the source and target domains involved in the 
mapping are primarily concerned with preserving the image-schemata or topography of the 
target domain whilst secondarily importing as much additional structure from the source 
domain as possible without endangering the preservation of the target.113 The issue with 
the invariance principle is that it promotes a form of literalism, though more on this in the 
final part of this section. For now, Nicolás Alessandroni articulates this mapping well when 
he says:  
“In this sense, the linguistic-conceptual meaning of a metaphorical expression will be 
determined by the mapping possibilities that exist between the elements pertaining 
to the source and target domains that preserve the topological structure of the 
target domain.”114 
What the invariance principle is helpful in recognising is that even if a metaphor is 
considered successful, it can never elucidate the complete picture of the concept in the 
target domain. Necessary to the process is the selection of appropriate lexical items, of 
preferences for particular parts of each domain’s associative networks. In this way the 
multiplicity of metaphorical application to the same concept is possible.  
Part 4.4 Dead and Living Metaphors 
We have dead metaphors because we have assumptively designated them as such through a 
high frequency of use 
 
While it is broadly agreed there is a spectrum of conventionality from highly conventional 
‘dead’ metaphors to highly poetic ‘living’ ones, disagreement arises around how these 
different types of metaphor function as well as their appropriate use cases. For Elisabeth 
Camp, an asset to the direct expressionist view is the existence of dead and dying 
metaphors. These are words or phrases that while once metaphorical have become so 
common in use that their nonliteral meaning has now become their primary meaning, for 
example: 
 
a.) I feel over the moon 
b.) This work is killing me 
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In these cases no time is spent cognitively eliminating the literal absurdity before continuing 
to mine their metaphorical meaning; the interpretation proceeds directly to the figurative. 
Camp qualifies this in remarking that dead metaphors lie at only one end of the spectrum of 
conventionality to novelty, with poetic metaphors such as, 
They cleave the gloom of dreams, a blinding flame,115 
being placed at the other end as a living metaphor. These are intentionally nonliteral 
phrases which require and invite sustained interpretive effort.116 Between these two poles 
are the conversational metaphors which are not as immediately available as their dead 
brothers nor as obligatorily opaque as their poetic sisters. Conversational metaphors such 
as,  
 
a.) This food’s delicious, Dave’s a magician 
b.) Longform writing is a gruelling hike 
 
all occupy this middle ground. It seems then that these conversational and poetic 
metaphors are less complimentary to the direct expressionist view than dead metaphors 
due to their increased need for interpretation. I would argue however that this is a false 
delineation. Instead, I suggest conversational metaphors are evidence for the nuanced way 
in which we assumptively assign categorisations like ‘dead’, ‘living’ and ‘conversational’. 
What makes metaphors alive or dead is their exploratory status. We have dead metaphors 
because we have assumptively designated them as such through a high frequency of use. 
This is why poetic metaphors are considered ‘living’, they have a low if not non-existent 
frequency of use. The process of recalling high frequency metaphors becomes more and 
more refined, and so it becomes engrained in a particular context with a particular meaning. 
In other words, as specific phrases become more and more common the exploratory 
pathway becomes more and more trodden.  
 
PART 5: The Obstacles of Conceptual Metaphor Theory 
 
In the part that follows I will discuss some of the obstacles facing conceptual metaphor 
theory and the amendments I believe they require of it. Bidirectional metaphors threaten 
the stability of the invariance principle, the relationship between private experience and 
language use is questioned, and CMT’s reliance on an idealised individual is all discussed 
below. All of the obstacles here require an expansion of what we consider cognitive 
metaphor theory to encompass. This expansion is one of the foundations for the RELICS 
method we will discuss in Section III.  
 
Part 5.1 Bidirectional Metaphors 
Evidence that cross domain mapping is not solely a method for ordering domains 
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There are obstacles that are not properly addressed in cognitive metaphor theory. There are 
issues surrounding presenting a cognitively valid concept of metaphor and the hierarchy of 
immediacy attributed to different domains of experience.117 The central tenet of conceptual 
metaphor theory being that “all abstract concepts ultimately derive from our immediate 
experience of physical action and perception”.118 All abstract concepts fall through a chain 
of association before emerging in our embodied experience: 
“Once a domain of knowledge becomes well known, it can itself serve as a source 
domain (basis) for understanding more novel concepts. After you have learned to 
think of light as a kind of water (that flows, pours in, fills the room, etc.), you can 
then learn to think about hope or reason as a kind of light. Ultimately, your 
knowledge of any abstract domain is thus grounded in your direct, first-hand, 
physical experience.”119 
Matthias W. Madsen offers the picture of a ‘tree of knowledge’ with our embodied 
experience as the trunk and increasingly abstract concepts, the branches and leaves. 
Madsen only offers this tree to chop it down however: his view, and one which I support, is 
that people do not have essentially the same bodies and relevant environments and, 
therefore, the same form of immediate experience is not a universal given. In other words, 
it is a mistake to construe “how ‘we’ think on the basis of linguistic observations or to 
expect a public language to reflect a private experience.”120 Madsen challenges that 
embodied experience is necessitated for the comprehension of metaphor.  
Naturally, in asserting the fallibility of conceptual metaphor theory the question regarding 
how we understand and engage with abstract concepts is left open. Madsen doesn’t answer 
this question and simply states that there are probably numerous strategies at the disposal 
of any given individual and that these strategies develop depending on age, circumstance, 
context and experience. The motivation behind his paper is to argue that a myriad of 
strategies cannot be amalgamated into a single ‘conceptual system’, much less a system 
that is expressly represented within language.121 One of the issues with the tree-of-
knowledge way of relating abstract concepts to embodied experience is when branches 
start to reach across the tree and fuse. This is what happens in the case of bidirectional 
metaphors. Conceptual metaphors like BIOLOGY IS POLITICS and POLITICS IS BIOLOGY are 
equally viable but also equally co-dependent; the cross domain mapping goes across, not 
down.  
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POLITICS IS BIOLOGY  
1. Ben-Gurion turned from a hawk into a dove  
2. Perry is leading the pack in new poll  
3. It’s is a sheep’s vote  
4. The GOP is playing alpha male 
 
BIOLOGY IS POLITICS  
1. The animal kingdom  
2. Dinosaurs ruled the earth  
3. The lion is the king of the beasts  
4. The law of the jungle  
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With other directional pairs including but not limited to: 
 
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS (A wild teenager) || ANIMALS ARE PEOPLE (A social insect) 
ORGANISMS ARE MACHINES (Hearts pump) || MACHINES ARE ORGANISMS (Computers think) 
COUNTRIES ARE FAMILIES (Founding fathers) || FAMILIES ARE COUNTRIES (My mom’s a dictator) 
COUNTRIES ARE BODIES (Head of state)|| BODIES ARE COUNTRIES (Immune defence) 
LANGUAGE IS MUSIC (Learn German by ear) || MUSIC IS LANGUAGE (I wrote that song)122 
 
All of these are evidence that cross domain mapping is not solely a method for ordering 
domains. If they were then, continuing the tree of knowledge metaphor, LANGUAGE would 
be the branch for MUSIC as well as the leaves; it would be simultaneously closer and further 
from our embodied experience. This would mean all of the domains mentioned in the 
examples above would collapse into a single equivalence class.123 Hence the tree of 
knowledge, the ordering of the abstract to the embodied, is an impossibility made apparent 
by the existence of bidirectional metaphors. From this it becomes conceptually problematic 
to claim that our embodied experience is the ‘root’ of our conceptual system when the tree 
doesn’t exist.  
 
Part 5.2 Private Experience and Language Use 
Shared language needn’t be universally indicative of the cognition of every individual 
For Madsen communicative pressures are another problematic wedge between our 
conceptual systems and the language we use. Namely, the societal pressures which require 
an individual’s use of language to prioritise intelligibility for their audience over faithfully 
expressing their private experience. 124 
“The difference between the personal experiences of different individuals is one 
source of variability that makes an inference form language use to psychology 
problematic. But there is also a time dimension to this variability: The world changes, 
and this entails changes in the skills sets, strategies, and cognitive styles of the 
people in it. Your relationship to wind, rain, salt, hunger, horses, roads, and fields is 
very different from that of a late medieval peasant or sailor. It would be a bit of a 
stretch to say you had the same ‘grounding’ for metaphorical uses of plow-through, 
nip it in the bud, know the ropes, or anchor.”125 
Madsen offers an analogy to clarify - drawing from a bag of marbles. Each individual has 
their own bag of marbles, each representative of a meaning. There is also another bag of 
marbles not attached to any individual which represents shared meaning. Each language-
use is a choice made by the individual to first either draw from their own bag of meaning, 
their private experience, or from the bag of shared meaning, collective agreement à la 
Mirriam-Webster or the Oxford English. Then the individual replaces a random marble 
within the shared meaning bag with the marble they selected (even if this marble came 
from the shared meaning bag to begin with). Over time the shared meaning bag will come 
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to reflect the average composition of the individual bags. However, and here is where 
Madsen deviates from cognitive metaphor theory, the variation between the individual bags 
themselves remains high. The only way to replace the marbles within the individual bags is 
through a change in the individual’s body or environment.126 Fortunately perhaps for 
cognitive metaphor theory this analogy is still one which illustrates a similar type of 
conceptual system with systematic patterns that cognitive metaphor theorists posit. The 
difference however, is Madsen’s model doesn’t require the constraining notion of a shared 
language being equally indicative of the cognition of any given individual.    
Part 5.3 Sensorial Paradigm Shifts 
“Shared experience does not reliably imply shared language, and shared language does not 
reliably imply shared experience”127 
Many languages, like English, contain a plethora of metaphors grounded in our embodied 
experience. From our visual experience come phrases like ‘I’ll see you around’ and ‘I see 
what you mean’, these being based on SIGHT IS PRESENCE and SIGHT IS KNOWING 
respectively. This grounding is less representative when we consider the millions of blind 
people who utilise the same language as those who are not. Whether being born blind or 
having blindness develop over time, these people still say and, more importantly, know 
what it means to say, ‘I’ll see you around’ and ‘I see what you mean’. This indicates that 
visual metaphors do not require individual visual experience; these metaphors can be 
intelligible to an individual both after sight has been lost and if it never existed. Now, not 
only do members of the blind community participate in the conceptual metaphors that 
abound what is framed within cognitive metaphor theory as ‘universal’, but also switch 
preferences for the conceptual metaphors which reflect their own embodied experience. 
Madsen supplies the inclusion and sometimes preference for MORE IS HEAVY or HIGH-
PITCHED conceptual metaphors over MORE IS UP because for visually impaired individuals 
weight and sound are better indicators of quantity than height.128 This preference however 
does not exclude these individuals from understanding and participating in the conceptual 
metaphors which are predisposed to individuals with vision; nor does it exile those 
individuals to a visually-impaired language that is only used and understood by members of 
that community. All of this is to explain that there are numerous ways in which an 
individual’s body changes and perhaps shifts outside of what might be considered cultural 
norms. Further, the behavioural strategies that any given individual employs in response to 
such a shift are equally numerous. Sensory loss as well as childbirth and trauma are all 
paradigm-shifting occurrences which fundamentally change an individual’s body and 
experiential world. These are all proof that “people who speak the same language do not 
necessarily ‘see’ the world the same way”. 129 
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What communicative pressures and sensorial paradigm shifts expose is that, as Madsen 
states, “shared experience does not reliably imply shared language, and shared language 
does not reliably imply shared experience”.130 
“This fact is easy to forget for a linguist studying the products of communication, 
since communication by definition requires us to overcome our differences. Language 
has a tendency to steamroll any idiosyncrasies that you and I have. For this reason, a 
psychology built on linguistic observation will always have a tendency to replace the 
cognition of the actual individual with cognition of an idealized average individual, 
and this fictional person might differ or not have much in common with any single 
member of the speech community.”131 
A dangerous consequence of cognitive metaphor theory is that it suggests that ‘immediate 
experience’ is universal; seemingly foregoing the notion that what stands in direct 
relationship with immediacy is the context provided by the particular individual and the 
space within which that individual operates. Madsen’s recommendation is a simple one: 
give up the assertion that linguistic behaviour is a direct expression of private experience.132 
We do not need to have personally embodied the same experience that motivates a 
conceptual metaphor in order to understand and use it. In other words, metaphors may 
initially rise in embodied experience, but their general use does not require that all others 
need to have shared said experience.    
PART 6: Pre-Cognitive Considerations 
 
In the part that follows we move into considering the pre-cognitive aspect of embodied 
experience which Lakoff and Johnson leave overlooked in their theory. This includes 
exploring multimodal metaphors and how pre-linguistic behaviour can express our 
embodied experience and our colloquial use of sentence non-literality. The contextualist 
approach to metaphor usage is also investigated before turning to ways in which these pre-
cognitive considerations have been used in the work of Victoria Harrison.  
 
Part 6.1 Multimodal Metaphors 
“Mind and culture should not be understood as being variables of a reactive context, but 
instead as two inseparable terms belonging to one co-construction process wherein each 
partakes in the genesis and production of the other” 133 
 
Whilst Alessandroni includes a list of research which explored new applications of non-
linguistic multimodal metaphors the majority of the work carried out maintained a linguistic 
logic.134 This is indicative of a restriction that the introduction of cognitive metaphor theory 
and its subsequent discourse created; in emphasizing the linguistic evidence for our 
cognitive processing, reliance is placed on dissecting and knowing our language. So, whilst 
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other modes were introduced by the theory, the preoccupation with language remained 
because that is where the evidence was believed to be found.    
 
The non-linguistic component of metaphorical thought is substantial, which is eluded to in 
CMT’s multimodal metaphorical instantiations. The myriad of offerings when it comes to 
defining metaphor is as wide ranging as its own instantiation. Naturally these definitions are 
equally, if not more, representative of the definer than the defined. The definition assumed 
and the analysis performed is particular to the discipline performing the analysis.  
There is an opportunity to explore the pre-linguistic behaviours on which metaphorical 
thought could be grounded. Specifically, how sociocultural contexts frame these behaviours, 
how different cultural configurations inform our ability to create and comprehend linguistic 
metaphors. 135 As we touched on with Madsen, this stems from a general critique of Lakoff 
and Johnson’s original CMT. Namely, the presence of an idealised individual at the centre of 
the theory upon which all assertions and assumptions are made. A homogenised individual 
who, whilst informed by their embodied experience of the environment, is expected to 
represent every individual in every environment. Alessandroni’s cultural psychological 
investigation of how image-schemata is culturally constructed is important because it values 
the bidirectional transference between anthropogenetic development and cognitive 
processes.  
Part 6.2 Sentence Non-Literality 
The relationship between what is said and what is conveyed 
 
For Kent Bach there is value to be gleaned from discussing the nature of loose talk. This 
loose talk isn’t the use of vague terms or exaggeration but our tendency to leave words out 
when speaking. When saying “I’m going for a drive” the driver does not include in my car or 
when saying “thank you for stopping by” the serviceperson does not include my place of 
work whereby I am contractually obliged to be pleasant. These are examples of what Bach 
calls impliciture, as opposed to Grice’s implicature. The latter is an indirect constative 
speech act in which one says and means one thing and by extension asserts something else 
in addition. With the former, impliciture, one says something but does not mean that; 
instead what is meant includes an implicit qualification -information that could have been 
made explicit but was not.136 An implication of impliciture is the construal of sentence 
nonliterality; the sentence as a whole is considered nonliteral, no specific part of the 
sentence is culpable.  
 
Fortunately Bach takes the time to address the relationship between what is said and what 
is conveyed in his implicitures. At first glance it appears to be simple entailment, a logical 
extension of the utterance, as in the following examples: 
1. (a) Legolas and Gimli fought in a battle. 
2. (b) Legolas grabbed a shield and skated on it. 
3. (c) Legolas surveyed the field and offered Gimli a box. 
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4. (a+) Legolas and Gimli fought in a battle together. 
5. (b+) Legolas grabbed a shield and skated on it down the stairs. 
6. (c+) Legolas surveyed the field and then offered Gimli a box.137 
What is taking place here through impliciture is conceptual strengthening. Although not 
actually uttered, the implicit qualification is nevertheless still conveyed. I have included this 
brief detour because even when we are speaking literally we aren’t speaking wholly literally. 
We leave out swathes of literal information when we converse. So to be a literalist and hold 
literal language as the pinnacle of communication is to not take seriously how malleable it 
is.  
 
Part 6.3 Direct Expression and Truth 
“Expressions used metaphorically are context-dependent expressions… constructing a 
metaphorical interpretation is not a case of sense selection but of sense creation.” 138 
 
To claim that all sentences containing metaphors as truth-valued is to stretch feasibility 
because the same sentences can be deployed in the form of questions, requests and 
imperatives. Therefore, as Anne Bezuihendout asserts, it would be more appropriate to 
state that all sentences containing metaphors directly express propositions. 139 It is only 
when these sentences take the form of an assertion are they made available to truth 
evaluation. A simple definition of figurative or nonliteral language is that one can say one 
thing and mean something else instead of or as well as what’s communicated. Within this 
possibility not only metaphor but other language uses such as irony and exaggeration are 
housed. It is this oversimplified definition that Bezuihendout challenges. She makes a case 
that in metaphorical uses of language what is said and what is meant are aligned, it is 
directly expressed. A specific distinction here is key; the characterisation of metaphorical 
interpretation as a semantic or pragmatic phenomenon. Traditionally the former was 
considered the assumptive method of metaphorical interpretation. Since the introduction of 
Lakoff and Johnson’s CMT and the emphasis of embodied experience, the support for the 
latter has become more widespread. Naturally there are arguments for both of these 
characterisations, too many to include here; however, the focus for Bezuihendout is that 
the pragmatic interpretation of metaphor takes its cue from its direct expression.  
 
Bezuidenhout calls her theory on metaphor and what is said a ‘contextualist’ conception 
because “it allows that some aspects of what is said may be entirely pragmatically 
determined. That is, there may be no syntactic or semantic rule that generates these 
aspects of what is said”.140 For example, two people are moving through an abandoned 
house and one says to the other: 
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It is silent in this house. 
The issue is there is a slight breeze coming through an open window, the floorboards 
beneath their feet are creaking and they are both anxiously breathing. All of which generate 
sound.141 Regardless, the person isn’t interpreted to be lying, ironic or sarcastic and 
something meaningful is still conveyed. The emphasis through italics in the above example 
is intentional, it denotes what is called an ad hoc concept. This ad hoc concept is an element 
within the proposition expressed through the above phrase. For this ad hoc concept to be 
comprehended the hearer must composite the meaning from various clues: the 
semantically encoded content of the word, the context within which it is spoken, the 
speaker’s state, as well as other environmental factors. 
Part 6.4 Exemplifying these Pre-Cognitive Considerations  
“The approach to meta-philosophical questions adopted here involves considering the deep 
conceptual structures underlying the ways in which the sense of what it is to know 
something is brought to conceptualization within different intellectual and cultural 
traditions”142 
Above is an excerpt from Victoria Harrison’s Seeing the Dao. As we have touched on already 
in our exploration of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphor theory, conceptual 
metaphors are those metaphors used as underlying conceptualisations wherein abstract 
concepts are reframed within our sensory experience. In this particular paper Harrison 
focuses on those conceptual metaphors she believes underlie and structure our 
understanding of what it is to know something or the ways in which we gain knowledge of 
something. Further, she draws attention to how those philosophical traditions that are 
characterised as ‘Western’, as well as some Indian philosophies, are framed within one 
primary conceptual metaphor. This stands in contrast with what Harrison believes is an 
alternative primary conceptual metaphor found in traditional East Asian philosophies.143 
Conceptual Metaphors and Philosophical Practices  
To claim a process as being metaphorical is not to strip it of its efficacy in conveying 
knowledge or truth 
 
Harrison makes the insight that “while the human capacity for reason is universal, reason is 
exemplified in practice by means of different metaphors that have a structuring role on 
conceptual systems”.144 Essentially, the similarity of human bodies, the environments in 
which those bodies are found and the experiences that come from the interaction between 
these two produces equally similar primary conceptual metaphors. This is because all 
‘normally functioning humans’ share the same formations of experience: visual, auditory, 
olfactory, haptic, and kinaesthetic. 145 Harrison does however fail to acknowledge those 
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people whose experiences fall outside the category of ‘normally functioning humans’ as in 
the case of sensorial paradigm shifts.  
From the perspective of CMT all abstract thought is primarily metaphorical, consequentially 
this means that the philosophical investigations of such abstractions and the answers they 
arrive at are necessarily metaphorical. If the reader’s reaction to this statement is one of 
disbelief this is an opportunity to remind ourselves of the literal versus nonliteral truth 
divide that we believe ourselves to be constantly facing  
This claim does however have consequences for philosophy and how it is conducted. If 
metaphorical thought is shaped by these primary conceptual metaphors then by extension 
the philosophy produced by this thought also takes this shape.146 Harrison’s essential view is 
that the various world philosophical traditions are based on and find expression through 
particular conceptual metaphors. Her paper Seeing the Dao focuses on two of these 
conceptual metaphors: KNOWING IS SEEING and KNOWING THE WAY or more specifically 
KNOWING IS KNOWING THE WAY. Whilst these are both conceptual metaphors grounded in 
our embodied experience we will explore how each of these have taken root in different 
parts of the world and the network of linguistic expressions which have subsequently 
emerged.  
Knowing is Seeing 
A fundamental difference between Western and Chinese philosophies is that the former is 
based on an ocular conceptual metaphor while the latter is based on a locomotive one  
 
The KNOWING IS SEEING conceptual metaphor is based on our human visual experience. To 
know something is to see something, specifically, to see it clearly. This is generally 
considered to be a universal constant and later we will explore the dangers of such a 
consideration. But for now, the KNOWING IS SEEING conceptual metaphor is found in all 
cultural and philosophical traditions because of this general universality. This conceptual 
connection between knowledge and sight is one planted deep within the Western traditions 
of thought; whether that be within the analytic tradition, or more broadly in Western 
culture. Knowing is an abstract activity; we are provided with a language to describe and 
interact with this activity when we cross its domain with that of a more concrete activity.  
 
This is not the only place it is found however, as Harrison expounds, some Indian modes of 
thought are also characterised by this conceptual metaphor. For example, pre-modern 
Indian philosophies refer to a veil which obstructs our view of ultimate reality; of which 
Kant’s noumenal/phenomenal distinction could be considered an echo. The conceptual 
connection between knowledge and sight also plays into how the discovery of truth is 
described, for instance: 
 
“…one common Mahāyāna Buddhist term for ‘conventional truth’ is saṃvṛti. This 
derives from the verbal root meaning to ‘cover, screen, veil, conceal, hide, surround 
or obstruct’. Conventional truth is taken to be truth about the world as we experience 
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it, not as it really is; the idea is that conventional truth can serve to conceal what is 
actually the case.”147 
 
Further, simply because we have found a way to articulate the phenomena of conceptual 
metaphor, of course isn’t to say that they are new themselves. The words for knowledge 
from Sanskrit and Pāli as well as from the Greek all have meanings which refer to vision; 
meanings which can be traced to their proto-Indo-European root weid: ‘to see, to know 
truly’.148 This is all to say that our various Western and Indian philosophies are conducted 
within the framework of this conceptual metaphor, which, Harrison argues, goes some way 
to explaining why the philosophy of religion’s initial pre-occupation with Western religions 
was eventually expanded to encompass the Indian philosophies, most notably the Buddhist 
traditions.149 Whilst in previous decades the difficult task of translation has been blamed for 
the comparative lack of Western study of Far Eastern philosophies, in light of conceptual 
metaphor theory it seems appropriate to seek an understanding of the conceptual 
connections at the foundation of those philosophies. Now there is an agreement that the 
conceptual schemata that underlies the Sinitic philosophies is quintessentially different to 
the schemata of the Western and Indian traditions. With this quintessential difference being 
acknowledged it is possible to examine and articulate the ways in which this difference 
informs their comparison. Essentially: 
“If basic concepts, such as ‘sameness’ and ‘difference’, ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, have 
different ranges of meaning within Chinese and Western thought, then – until this is 
understood – cross-cultural philosophical understanding will be seriously 
compromised.” 150 
The KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor is nonetheless one grounded in universal human 
experience. So the difference is not that Chinese philosophy has no evidence for the 
KNOWING IS SEEING metaphor in its language; instead, it gives way to a different 
conceptual schemata, KNOWING IS KNOWING THE WAY.  
Harrison references the character combination 知道, zhīdao or ‘to know’ has having a high 
frequency of use within the language. The combination denotes the meaning ‘to know’ 
whilst the characters 知 (zhī) and 道 (dào) when individually interpreted represent, usually, 
‘know’ and ‘way, path’. Naturally it would be reductive to think this is all these words 
represent and there are other usage cases. With this in mind it seems that KNOWING IS 
ACTING is the conceptual metaphor at play. That movement is the embodied experience 
that we can frame the concept of ‘knowing’ within. Harrison believes however that decisive 
movement is not linked closely enough to our basic sensory experience; that a more 
fundamental experience is at play; KNOWING THE WAY. Here: 
“the culmination of knowledge is understood not in terms of a grasp of abstract 
principles but rather as an ability to move through the world and human society in a 
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manner that is completely spontaneous and yet still fully in harmony with the 
normative order of the natural and human worlds. 151 
Seeing the Dao  
The differences between different philosophical traditions can be used to alter the 
conceptual metaphors at the root of those differences 
 
Whilst there are fundamental differences there is still the opportunity for discovery through 
dialogue thanks to the shared universal experience of the human condition. There is a level 
of ubiquity which primary metaphors carry which means whilst a single primary metaphor 
might not hold prominence in every area of the world, it is reasonable to suspect that it is at 
least present. Within inter-cultural disciplines then, it would be of benefit to find ways of 
utilising these primary metaphors. One such utilisation is their cross-pollination. Here we 
arrive at the impetus behind the title Seeing the Dao; a combination of KNOWING IS SEEING 
and KNOWING IS KNOWING THE WAY.152 This is not the first time that such a fusion has 
occurred. With the migration of Indian philosophy to China, Chan, later Zen, Buddhism 
emerged alongside other forms of Chinese Buddhism which adopted conceptual schemata 
from both in creating its own system.  
 
So in Chan Buddhism, a state of enlightenment is one in which a person sees “nothing other 
than the world of our everyday experience, the world which we know by moving through 
it”. 153 The path towards this state of enlightenment is one paved by practices “designed to 
facilitate that unobstructed vision and movement”.154 This tradition is an example of the 
blending of primary metaphors to create SEEING THE WAY. This is all to say there are ways 
in which the differences between different philosophical traditions can transcend the 
conceptual metaphors that individually bind their perspectives. These possibilities open the 
possibility for a meta-philosophy that is indeed universal; one of the consequences of this 
universal meta-philosophy is the formation of an inter-cultural philosophy of religion that 
can simultaneously appreciate and learn from the differences that separate cultures whilst 
also traversing and bridging those same cultures through deep co-understanding.  
 
PART 7: Conceptual Metaphor Theory and Religion 
 
In this fourth and final part we look at how cognitive metaphor theory has already 
influenced philosophers of religion and the ideas that arrive out of such an integration. 
Specifically the role both old and new metaphors play in religious language and how CMT 
informs Edward Slingerland’s embodied realism approach to religion.   
 
Part 7.1 Applications in Religious Language 
A brief aside on negative theology 
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A concern for the nature of religious language is whether or not it is possible to talk about 
God without misrepresenting that which is being referred to, as well as whether that 
language carries anything meaningful about the referent. Religious language is usually 
understood as both the written and spoken language typically employed by religious 
believers when they describe their religious experiences and beliefs. Issues arise  from this 
when non-religious people can employ the exact same language but not with reference to 
religious experiences and beliefs. So if not in the words themselves, wherein does the 
religiosity of this particular type of language reside?  
 
Victoria Harrison offers the following definition: religious language is “language that is used 
either to serve a religious purpose or in a religious context, or both.”155 This definition has 
been included here because it articulates broadly the function and environment of the 
specific type of language we are concerned with. Naturally there are concerns regarding the 
boundaries of a religious context and the origins of a religious purpose however these 
concerns are not the concerns of this paper. What is of concern is how a world-
transcendental God, as reported in the Abrahamic traditions for example, is described using 
mundane religious language. As mentioned previously this issue has been a longstanding 
one with a myriad of responses. The literalist interpretation of religious language wherein a 
world-transcendent God is the genuine referent is one such response. This is problematic 
when considering how a world-bound literal language refers to a world-transcendent God; a 
being beyond language. This then leads into negative theology wherein a religious believer 
can only legitimately make ‘God is not…’ statements rather than ‘God is…’ statements. 
 
Part 7.2 Old and New Conceptual Metaphors 
The introduction of new conceptual metaphors within religious language specifically allows 
for the potential of new experienced realities 
 
Whilst the majority of the conversation so far has been on the conceptual metaphors that 
we have developed and been developed by, cognitive metaphor theory has implications for 
how we might shape our experiences in the future. The creation of new conceptual 
metaphors is not an impossibility; the cross domain mappings provided by THE BRAIN IS A 
COMPUTER has become ubiquitous. The adoption of new primary metaphors to our 
conceptual system enables new experiences of our reality. A conceptual metaphor’s ability 
to only frame a particular perspective of any given concept at any given time leads to the 
opportunity for the multiplicity of conceptual metaphors. This has major repercussions for 
religious language and by extension religious diversity.  
 
Harrison takes Lakoff and Johnson’s claim that people who employ different conceptual 
metaphors may experience different realities and applies this to religious diversity. The 
introduction of new conceptual metaphors within religious language specifically allows for 
the potential of new experienced realities. Specifically, new conceptual metaphors can 
make available new religious experiences that otherwise would not have been possible. 
These changes in experienced reality within a religious context aren’t new. Whilst not 
completely original, the ushering in of the GOD IS FATHER concept to Semitic monotheism 
by Jesus has shaped the experienced realities of millions of people. Equally so the 
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conceptual metaphors embedded in the scriptures of the world traditions each play a role in 
generating these experienced realities.156 As long as the conceptual metaphor foundation of 
these experienced realities is honoured then they are, on a linguistic level, void of conflict. If 
conceptual metaphors necessarily only convey a particular perspective on a particular 
referent then the experienced realities that they support must be similarly constituted.  
Framing religious language within this understanding of conceptual metaphor exposes a 
problematic aspect of articulating religious experience. If a conceptual metaphor maintains 
prominence within a tradition then it, by consequence, prescribes a particular way of 
experiencing the divine whilst preventing others. The logical end point of such an assertion 
is most if not all religious traditions have been formed by and through specific conceptual 
metaphors.157 The repercussion of this end point is twofold. Firstly, if a religious community 
becomes consciously aware of the conceptual metaphors that drive their experience of the 
divine, this not only allows a deeper exploration of those constructs, but it also allows the 
development of alternative constructs that explore those aspects of the experience which 
are not articulated within those already embedded. Secondly, this same internal exploration 
of alternative constructs can be replicated externally. A deeper comprehension of the 
conceptual metaphors at the foundation of other traditions leads to a deeper compassion 
towards those people whose experienced reality is different. As the world faces increasing 
globalisation and people are more dependent on one another then this can only be a good 
thing. Experimentation with concepts and new metaphors is as essential for people in the 
present as the creation of now traditional metaphors were essential to the people of the 
past. To explore new metaphors is not to forsake ‘old’ ones; it is to add to the collection of 
tools at our collective disposal.  
Part 7.3 Comparative Religion 
“If we want to know what people really think about [a] concept, then we need to look at the 
actual metaphors they use when discussing the concept rather than third- person, 
theoretical accounts of the concept”158 
Individuals vary from one another within a given community. Belief systems are the metric 
of choice for Edward Slingerland. This variance however can also be found at the individual 
level with very few individuals maintaining entirely consistent beliefs and attitudes. 159 As 
we will explore in a moment, many people are prone to switching their beliefs and attitudes 
depending on the situation they find themselves in. These ‘inconsistent’ beliefs and 
attitudes are not the result of a confused individual. Rather, given the wide variation of 
environments and contexts within which we find ourselves, it is implausible to think we are 
capable of maintaining consistent beliefs in the absolute. What Slingerland offers is a new 
methodology for cross-cultural comparative work. Framing research through the concept of 
embodied cognition, the foundations of which are the embodied realism present in Lakoff 
and Johnson’s conceptual metaphor theory. 
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This methodology of embodied cognition relies on tenets of conceptual metaphor theory. 
Namely, that human cognition is dependent and comprised of cross domain mappings and 
that this cognition is independent of the language we use; further, the language we use that 
seemingly displays these cross domain mappings are simply representations of deeper 
cognitive processes.160 What Slingerland is interested in specifically, and hence the inclusion 
of his work here, is the projection mappings that occur within a metaphor. The particular 
version of projection mappings that Slingerland is working with is one which characterises 
the process as using one domain, the source, to talk and understand another domain, the 
target. We will discuss later why this particular understanding is problematic but for now it 
is important to work with this conceptualisation as we explore Slingerland’s methodology.   
“If we want to study what people think about religion and how this differs from other 
ways of thinking, then we should be looking at the level of conceptual metaphor 
rather than individual words (the word fetishism approach) or philosophical theories 
(the theory-based approach). In other words, if we want to know what people really 
think about concept X, then we need to look at the actual metaphors they use when 
discussing the concept rather than third- person, theoretical accounts of the 
concept.”161 
Here is where metaphor supports the embodied cognition method. Any given conceptual 
metaphor necessarily only represents a part of the target domain. No single metaphor can 
illustrate all of the entailments of a concept because, the view of said concept is defined by 
the source domain through which the illustration is done. This is a strength, however, this 
means that different conceptual metaphors can be employed in different situations to 
illustrate the entailments appropriate for a particular situation. These metaphors can co-
exist through their mutual applicability; forks and spoons are both categorically cutlery, 
soups and salads are both categorically entrées. Different people will use different cutlery to 
get at the same food. Exploring soups with forks is an important point we will attend to in 
later segments.    
There are issues however that Slingerland inherits from conceptual metaphor theory with 
his embodied realism. For example, asserting that there are conceptual metaphors that are 
universal among human cultures. In identifying with these propositions Slingerland creates a 
method which, when abused, leads to the dismissal of differences in favour of the 
similarities. When this is applied within a cross-cultural context learning is hindered when 
similarities are favoured over differences. Once we become conscious of the conceptual 
metaphors that underly and support our conceptual systems we will become better 
equipped to wield those metaphors as exploratory tools and seek a deeper understanding 
of the conceptual systems of others.   
CONCLUSIONARY REMARKS 
Over the course of this section we have covered Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphor 
theory, its strengths and limitations as well as seen how it might be applied with the 
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philosophy of religion. The strength of the theory is its foundational premise; the conceptual 
system which we use to comprehend and relate to our experienced reality and the 
conceptual schemata of which it is comprised is fundamentally metaphorical in nature. 
Beyond this there are improvements to be made. 
The invariance principle struggles to find a reply to the existence of bidirectional metaphors. 
I suggest that we make a departure from the unidirectional assumption that comes with the 
‘source’ and ‘target’ nomenclature currently in circulation. These terms would be 
substituted for terms, ‘internalised’ and ‘external’ respectively. This reshaping of the source 
and target domains into the internalised and external domains is to allow for 
omnidirectional movement. Instead of image schemata moving from source domain to 
target domain, an embodied experience of the external domain is met by the internalised 
image schemata. Alternatively internalised image schemata can be used to articulate or 
explore abstract concepts necessarily housed in the external domain. Essentially, instead of 
one domain supervening over the other as in the first system, the domains are on equal 
planes which through cross domain mapping move towards each other to create a new 
central topography. I introduce this concept here because it will be expanded and built 
upon in the final section.  
To literalise a metaphor or to presume it dead is to exhaust it’s explorative value. A 
dangerous designation to make when such a metaphor could be used for further 
exploration whether it be re-applied it existing contexts or new ones. This is what an 
enlivening of once dead metaphors could look like. In Section III we will discuss how 
conceptual metaphors can be constituted as living in their role in articulating embodied 
religious experience.  
CMT’s preoccupation with an idealised individual upon which all assertions and 
observations are made is also problematic. Which is why I recommend co-opting some of 
the tenets of relevance theoretics. Namely that the interpretations and therefore relevance 
of conceptual metaphors are dependent on the context within which they are used. This is 
reaffirmed in Madsen’s bag of marbles example; with the shared meaning bag (conceptual 
metaphors) reflecting the average composition of the individual bags with the variation 
between those individual bags (personal conceptual schemata) remaining high. In this way 
individuals have access to the shared collection of conceptual metaphors which are in turn 
used to structure their conceptual schemata. This is the foundation of the tail-end of the 
RELICS method, the inter-personal conceptual schemata 
All of this rests on a modern theological realism framed with semantics as a theory of 
meaning for a class of statements instead of the objects to which those statements refer. 
This allows for both the introduction of new conceptual metaphors within religious 
language as well as the opportunity for old conceptual metaphors to become exploratory 
once more. Both of these have the potential to provide new experienced realities. With this 
re-orientation of theological realism we become better equipped to not only curate a 
deeper understanding of our own conceptual systems but the conceptual systems of others. 
Each of these suggestions for expansion and improvement of cognitive metaphor theory are 
cornerstones in the RELICS method. These cornerstones are what we will be working with in 
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Section III, but first we need to elucidate the nature of conceptual schemata and ground 































In this third and final section we synthesise the findings of the prior sections. First we 
address a possible destination in George Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic theory of religion 
before moving on to an assertion of the RELICS method. Between the refutation of 
Lindbeck’s theory and positing the RELICS method in the first and third parts we will briefly 
consider the semiotics of religion as we will need to be mindful of the meaning making 
process when it comes time to proposing this method.  
 
PART 8: Cultural-Linguistic Theory as a Possible Destination 
 
In the following part we examine George Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic theory of religion. 
This theory has been so impactful in the philosophy of religion that a comprehensive 
exploration is necessary to understand the totality of Lindbeck’s view. However, considering 
the interdisciplinary nature of this thesis and therefore its limited scope I will have to 
endeavour to capture the broad strokes essential to his position. After this I will resound 
and expand on criticisms and concerns academics have shared regarding this cultural-
linguistic theory. 
 
Part 8.1 Cultural-Linguistic Theory of Religion 
 
In his book The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age George 
Lindbeck offers his cultural-linguistic theory of religion. The aim of which is to offer the 
opportunity for reconciliation without capitulation between traditions while maintaining the 
legitimacy of those traditions.162 Here he asserts that religious experience is necessarily 
grounded and shaped by our cultural and linguistic forms. In order for an individual to have 
a religious experience they must first have the capacity and familiarity with the linguistic 
system of a given religion. However, Lindbeck admits himself that his theory is better suited 
as a nontheological study of religion.163 Within the cultural-linguistic approach religions are 
seen as “comprehensive interpretive schemes, usually embodied in myths or narratives and 
heavily ritualised”.164 From this understanding religion is a cultural and linguistic framework 
that shapes the thoughts and actions of an individual.  
 
Religions, within this framework, are considered codes by which the interpretation of 
religious experience may occur. The assertion that is of central import is that once a religion 
is learned, its code of language assumed it becomes the “preexperiential physical basis of 
their conscious experience and activity”.165 This is to the extent that language shapes the 
domains of human existence that are pre-cognitive.   
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Part 8.2 General Critique of the Cultural-Linguistic Theory of Religion 
 
With Language as Expression: A Wittgensteinian Critique of the Cultural-Linguistic Approach 
to Religion Molly Haslam achieves her eponymous task of getting at the core issues of 
Lindbeck’s theory. Some of these are warranted critiques, others we will shift and develop 
to be more applicable within the context of this paper. Following Haslam, Lindbeck cites 
Wittgenstein’s work as a foundation for his own theory. Haslam’s contention being that 
upon closer reading of Wittgenstein we find not that experience is dependent on 
symbolisation but its prelinguistic precursor.166 Naturally this stands in sharp contrast to her 
understanding of his theory of religion: 
 
“Thus, Lindbeck defines religion as "a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or 
medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought." Given this view of religion, 
doctrines are conceived neither as propositional statements of truth nor as symbolic 
statements expressive of an underlying religious sentiment. Rather, doctrines 
function here as "communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude, and action." 
167 
 
For Lindbeck, Wittgenstein argues that all symbols and their systems are characteristically 
interpersonal which is evidenced in the logical impossibility of private languages. From this, 
it is equally impossible to have experiences that are exclusively private; experience requires 
symbolisation, and symbolisation cannot be exclusively private as it relies on interpersonal 
meaning making: 
 
“Rather than view the human person in a dualistic sense in which the body is taken to 
be senseless and sensations are taken to be objects of ‘inner’ perception accessible 
only to the perceiving person, Wittgenstein maintains a monist view in which 
sensations are taken to be states of a living organism that have natural expression in 
the behaviour of living organisms.” 168 
 
Sensations have the capacity to be private, irrespective of how they are communicated they 
remain of the individual living organism. These sensations received by our embodied 
experience therefore have the potential to be pre-linguistic. I say potential here, because I 
think specifically it is those embodied experiences and their pre-linguistic expression which 
inform the conceptual schemata that dictates our language use. This also keeps in step with 
an intrareligious understanding in terms of the at times inherent wordlessness of religious 
experience.  
 
However, as Lindbeck contends, the cultural-linguistic theory asserts that religious 
experience is never pre-linguistic and therefore constantly grounded and shaped by our 
cultural and linguistic forms. So, in order for an individual to have a religious experience 
they must first have the capacity and familiarity with the linguistic system of a given religion. 
I, like Haslam, disagree with Lindbeck’s central assertion; language is not necessary for 
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experience. Our experiences are expressed through our behaviours, with only one of these 
being language. Examples of individual’s expressing themselves beyond language can be 
seen everywhere. Small children mirroring others around them, people with intellectual 
disabilities for whom language is not possible communicating through other avenues and 
dancers who can say a whole lot without ‘saying’ anything. To claim that language is 
necessary for experience, as the cultural-linguistic theory does, is to wrongly limit the scope 
within which human beings participate and interact with their world. 
 
In support of this, Christopher I. Lehrich offers the example of music. At its best ‘music 
expresses itself for itself, in itself, absolutely’.169 Music can exist outside of language as a 
medium for translating and expressing an individual’s embodied experience. This is not 
mirrored in Yelle’s work where in delineating different language forms he does so at the 
exclusion of the other modes of meaning making.    
Lehrich maintains that a semiotics of music must specifically acknowledge that 
production and reception need not directly connect. In other words, the intention of the 
composer and the effect on the listener does not need to align in order for the music to 
communicate. Further, this non-alignment is not representative of any failure on the 
composer or listener’s part.170 A semiotics of religion may borrow similar characteristics; 
whereas a semiotics based solely on language is concerned with the effective 
communication of embodied experience a semiotics that includes this musical undertone 
instead values the effective expression of embodied experience.    
 
This approach to embodied experience finds parallels with Peter Meyer as he maintains 
“immediacy rather than mediacy becomes of eminent theological value”. 171 Meyer’s own 
work in Speaking Reality: Language Research and Lived Experience in Practical Theology 
essentially expounds this view in greater detail and evolves this key idea of embodied 
experience and immediacy. He echoes a distinction made in this paper, that language does 
not mediate experience but is rather an expressive medium of experience.172 Language is 
one of the means through which an individual is able to make their embodied experience 
tangible. The embodied experience is already felt, but it is through this manifesting that it 
becomes tangible; it becomes something that can conceived of or ‘touched’. In other words, 
language is one of the tools through which we move our internal private experience to an 
external personal account.   
 
Part 8.3 C. John Sommerville and Religious Expression  
“For it isn't just ultimate "questions" that religion deals with. It is ultimate experiences and 
ultimate commitments” 173 
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In response to Lindbeck’s cultural-linguistic theory of religion C. John Sommerville demands 
a more inclusive view which acknowledges not only religion’s linguistic but also expressive 
and cognitive elements. One of the facets of Lindbeck’s position is that religious experience 
first requires the existence of a religious awareness of mental structure; this illustrates 
Lindbeck’s bias towards the linguistic. It appears that the inverse is true or at least more 
representative of religious experience. Namely, such experiences depend on an initial state 
of non-religious awareness; this type of phenomena is so “striking precisely because it is an 
anomaly within our general expectation of ordinariness”.174 From this then religious 
language is not the foundation of but the response to religious experience. Sommerville 
illustrates this in his differentiation of moments within an experience: 
 
1.) Awareness of something truly anomalous and, therefore, outside the normal world 
of experience and  
2.) The identification of that awareness or experience as religious.175 
 
In this formulation it becomes apparent that embodied experiences, specifically those of a 
religious nature, can start in direct intuition. This is because the first moment is 
characteristically unique comparative to any other experience because it subverts, confuses 
or refuses attempts at natural interpretation.  
 
Ultimately, Lindbeck’s metric for the study of religion is ‘truth’, whilst for Sommerville it is 
‘power’. This can alternatively be called the substance of a religion. A religion’s efficacy is 
measured in its power. However, there is a difference between the power of religion and 
the power of religious experience. The power of religious experience is in its capacity to 
affect and change an individual. The power of religion is in its ability to offer a language that 
best describes that experience and therefore facilitates that change. It can aid in the 
identification of the experience but the awareness remains with the individual.  
With Sommerville’s assertion of power as the primary metric of religion he assumes 
an intrareligious perspective. This is to say there is an honouring of the experience of the 
people within the traditions of which are the topic of study. Lindbeck, though Christian 
himself, maintains a secularised position with his cultural-linguistic theory. In Sommerville’s 
words; 
 
“A discussion of religion that never mentions power will seem empty to those who 
think of religion more as a thing of the "spirit" than of the "mind," and this is 
connected to secularization.” 176 
 
To be a philosopher an individual needs only to entertain a philosophy. To be religious an 
individual needs to do more than entertain a religion. While it may be inspired by and 
informed by religious experience, theology sits within the former, within philosophy; it is a 
reflection upon religion, not religion itself. Here it is evidenced that religion engages with 
power, while philosophy of religion is, broadly speaking, concerned with truth claims.177 
Here, religion can be construed as a response to a kind of power. What this responsiveness 
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entails is a level of activity more appropriate to a verb or adverb rather than a noun. 178 This 
would reaffirm the intrareligious perspective of Sommerville’s writing; with religion 
understood as a practice first and foremost.  
 
In contrasting Lindbeck and Sommerville it is apparent that at least in a professional 
capacity the former considers religion more as a cognitive function. The latter is focused on 
maintaining a theory within which religion is a method for salvation, an exercise of power. 
Sommerville explicitly uses the term salvation in his conclusory remarks, which echoes 
Hick’s preoccupation with how a religious tradition’s efficacy is tied up with its salvific 
opportunities. From this we can learn that RELICS is a method which should acknowledge, 
honour and be orientated towards the salvific beliefs of these religious communities whilst 
not maintaining that those beliefs be the metric upon which they are validated. In other 
words, RELICS is a method that needs to operate within the domain of the philosophy of 
religion whilst maintaining a deep resonance with the self-understanding of the various 
religious traditions in the world. 
 
PART 9: Brief Considerations for the Semiotics of Religion 
 
In this intermediate part we consider the semiotics of religion. This is where we will examine 
different suggestions for how meaning making occurs within religious language. Naturally 
this, like the majority of the subjects explored within this paper, maintains its own myriad of 
debates and theses. The small dive taken here is to establish a context and introduce 
specific language for the establishment of the RELICS method.      
 
Part 9.1 Lluis Oviedo and Religion as Language 
 
Lluis Oviedo asserts that a new, more complex understanding of religion is reliant on a more 
sophisticated account of human nature. Further, that the human feature of language is an 
appropriate framework for this complex understanding.179 This natural language is the 
foundation for specialised or derived languages. These are languages that pertain to a 
particular field, activity or general subset of the human experience. Oviedo suggests that it 
would benefit the study of religion if we thought of it as one of these derived languages. 
From this understanding, religion is founded in a natural language while introducing its own 
semantic field and grammar appropriate for the expression of the experiences of the 
individuals who use it. However, religion as a language extends beyond religious language 
itself; it encompasses an integrated “system of references comprising external symbols, 
rituals, images, a calendar, a set of social roles and rules, and established behaviour 
codes”.180 
 
Like natural languages coming in a variety of forms, whether they be Swahili or Spanish, so 
too we have a variety of religions. Like natural languages, religions require evolution and the 
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179 Oviedo, Lluis. 2015. "Religion As A Language: Exploring Alternative Paths In Conversation With 
Postreductionist Anthropologies". Zygon 50 (4): p985-86. 
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incorporation of new terms and rules to remain vital in new contexts. One of the ways 
religion achieves this is in combining with other derived languages whether that be art, law, 
morality and so on. 181 In this combination more complex expressions are made available.  
Oviedo acknowledges that in treating religion as a language we align ourselves more 
with the conscious and reflective mind and as a result become less concerned with the 
subconscious and spontaneous being. 182 Though like with any natural language its everyday 
use becomes more spontaneous and less reflective or laboured over time. The strength of 
the religion as a language approach is that it creates a structure for the study of the 
cognitive and cultural elements of any given religious tradition as well as their interaction; in 
the same way Mandarin and Xhosa are no more true than the other perhaps so too are 
Christianity and Sikhism. 
 
The weaknesses of such a position however outweigh these strengths. In relying on the 
structure of language we run the risk of not accounting for instances that fall outside that 
structure. Religion as a language and its reliance on an integrated which contains but is not 
limited to religious language seems to be a category too large to be useful. Conceiving of 
religion as a derived language places it at the mercy of examining sub-derived languages. 
Film is said to have a visual language but director Christopher Nolan has his own visual 
language that operates within that area. So too do many religious people have their own 
religious language, a language that may very well sit within a larger language but is 
nevertheless deeply personal and specific to the individual. Ironically, what the study of 
religion as a language fails to capture is religion’s religious character; the paradigm shifting 
re-orientation of an individual’s experienced reality. In examining religion as a language we 
lose the pre-linguistic nature of embodied experience. So while perhaps useful from a socio-
cultural perspective, this fails to capture religious life beyond language.   
 
Part 9.2 Jonathan Tran’s Attuned Speakers 
“The weight of any idiom’s utterance requires an entire universe of constellated relationships 
within which the utterance exerts its gravity”183 
 
This weight of an idiom is provided by the context within which an idiom is used; of which is 
itself comprised of a myriad of factors from social, political and cultural conditions, to 
internal mental states and external world objects and settings. The myriad of factors at play 
are by nature agreements between attuned speakers. This attunement can be as specific as 
that of an immediate family or as broad as the human species. These agreements are the 
binding agent of an idiom’s meaning while simultaneously providing the means by which an 
idiom’s weight may shift or even change meaning. 184  
This is a lofty assertion, especially when it appears on the surface as the 
prioritisation of language. However, this is not that; attunement can come about through 
different methods of which language is one. A concern that arises from this assertion is that 
although it is certainly plausible that linguistic conventions contribute to meaning and 
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correct usage it is implausible to consider all meaning is this attunement or communal 
agreement. This would be a valid concern if Tran’s assertion didn’t extend beyond linguistic 
conventions. However, this is not the case as he instead prioritises the embodied 
experiences of those in attunement.  
 
 
Part 9.3 Iris M. Yob on Metaphor and Religious Language 
 
As Iris M. Yob describes it, metaphor, within the context of religious language, provides 
‘cognitive access to realities presumed to exist’. 185 Metaphor’s capacity for both exploration 
and explanation means it is not required to prove the existence of the concept which it 
designates. In following this description Yob provides the Egyptian term Ka, its assigned bird 
symbol and a shadow soul capable of reinhabiting the bodies of the deceased signified by 
said term and symbol. The use of this term and symbol did not function as a proving of its 
designated concept; rather it allowed the Egyptians to explore notions of the afterlife and 
reflect those explorations in their burial rites. 186 Metaphor exists first and foremost as an 
exploratory tool. As a means of exploring the interiority or private experience of an 
individual as well as the spaces and concepts that extend beyond that experience. 
 
The danger present in any given metaphor is to deem it solely explanative. To take a 
metaphor literally is to strip it of its explorative power. In doing this we discourage the 
exploration of the ideas and meanings offered. This remains true of even the oldest and 
most commonplace metaphors we have. There is an entire discourse surrounding what are 
called ‘live’ and ‘dead’ metaphors and the semantic divide between them. The former being 
the creative poetic metaphors or the obvious cases and the latter being those phrases 
whose once nonliteral meaning has become their first or only meaning. This is a false 
dichotomy; phrases do not leap over the chasm between the literal and nonliteral. We stop 
exploring the ideas that they offer in favour of the comfort of the well-known path. The 
phrase ‘food for thought’ is no less metaphorical than when it first originated. We simply 
explored the concept so many times through continual use that the process of exploration 
has become nigh instantaneous. There’s a reason why ‘Heavenly Father’ is at the top of the 
prayer and not slid somewhere in the middle. This is all to say that just because a metaphor 
has become commonplace does not mean alternatives should not be sought nor that it has 
lost its own explorative efficacy. Just because a metaphor is old does not mean it is 
exhausted. 
 
A further characteristic of metaphor within this religious context is that multiple metaphors 
can be  used to explore the notions of the transcendent. This can be either within the 
framework of a single transcendental Real for which the different religious traditions are 
different explorative metaphors. Or, it can be within the framework of each religious 
tradition using multiple metaphors to explore their own religious experience. The assertion 
offered here is that wherever you fall in the debate, the explorative power of metaphor and 
our essential need for it is equally constituted in each perspective.  
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PART 10: Hyper-Pluralism and the RELICS Method 
 
The intentional structure up until this point in the paper is that each part of each section has 
been segmented further based on a unifying idea. Considering that the content of this part 
is the unifying idea of the paper this structure will be replaced by a listing of two sets of 
assertions. The first set establishes the need for a hyper-pluralist account of religious 
diversity while the second set is the foundation of the RELICS method, a response to this 
need. Each set is accompanied by explanations that go into the reasoning behind them. 
Finally a brief moment will be taken to provide some conclusions, limitations and possible 
applications of the RELICS method.     
 
Part 10.1 First Set 
    
1.) A pluralist position that prescribes a notion of the noumenal Real, no matter how 
progressive, will always find adversaries. 
therefore 
2.) A religious theory of religious pluralism cannot escape the exclusivist-inclusivist-
pluralist trichotomy. 
therefore 
3.)  A hyper-pluralist account of religious diversity needs to transcend this trichotomy.   
therefore 
4.) A hyper-pluralist account of religious diversity instead relies on embodied religious 




While the Kantian distinction was useful for Hick it meant that his pluralism was 
preoccupied with the accounting of both the phenomenal and noumenal aspects of 
religious life. The noumenal Real by nature is not directly perceptible but we are able to 
relate to it through the phenomenal Real. Therefore, any theory that makes claims on the 
nature of the noumenal Real - for example Hick and the ultimacy of the soteriological 
concern – becomes at least in part prescriptive. This is evidenced in the requirement for 
change in the self-understanding of most religious adherents.       
 
For a pluralism to earn the prefixal ‘hyper’ it needs to supervene on the trichotomy 
mentioned above. It does this by relying not on the specific conception of the various 
phenomenal Real but on how those conceptualisations come to be made manifest. The 
implication being that regardless of the phenomenal Real, the conceptual schemata we use 
for its construction as well as the means by which we relate to it are universal. In this way, 
whether or not an individual is inclusivist, exclusivist or pluralist the underlying conceptual 
system by which they formulate their perspective, whilst aesthetically different, is 
constituted within the same method.  
 
From this understanding we remove the coercive element of a regular pluralist position on 
two fronts. First, a hyper-pluralist position is characteristically and wholly a descriptive 
perspective which examines universal human capacities rather than the reports of the 
 60 
noumenal Real that these capacities may offer. Second, unlike pluralism, it cannot be 
construed as another form of exclusivism because the foundation of a hyper-pluralist theory 
is the examination of the evidence and the means by which the members of the trichotomy 
make their own arguments.    
 
Hyper-pluralism supervenes the trichotomy specifically because it is the mode by which the 
exponents of any given position give their evidence. In other words, it is not what we are 
saying but how we are saying it that underlies a hyper-pluralist position. There is no longer a 
superior noumenal reference point by which to frame all discourse; rather the reference 
point needs to be distinctly human. As we will explore soon with the RELICS method the 
point of reference is the relationship between embodied experience and the conceptual 
schemata used in the relating to that experience. In maintaining embodied experience as 
the foundation of a hyper-pluralist position there is a reliance not on an unapproachable 
relativity but a study of a necessarily human objectivity. This also circumvents Buridan’s 
paradox as the question is no longer why an individual may choose one tradition over the 
other but that any and every individual has reasons and is capable of making that choice.  
 
Hyper-pluralism is also distinctly and necessarily a philosophical position on religious 
experience, not a religious philosophy of religion. Religion and religious experience are 
different entities; people are capable of having ‘religious’ or ‘spiritual’ experiences without 
adhering to a specific religion. Religion, then, is a collection of verbal and non-verbal 
communications that are employed for the purpose of communicating religious embodied 
experiences. From this distinction a hyper-pluralist position can operate on a pre-religious 
tradition level so that it adheres not only to the embodied experiences of those within a 
religious tradition but also those outside those traditions. Further it is motivated by a 
shifting from diversity-as-problem-to-be-solved to diversity-as-difference-to-be-valued. If 
successful a hyper-pluralist position dissolves unmerited boundaries to reveal educational 
differences. We turn now to an offering of the RELICS method, a hyper-pluralist account of 
religious diversity.  
 
Part 10.2 Second Set 
 
1.) Conceptual metaphor theory, while useful, fails to properly capture embodied 
religious experience and therefore religious expression. 
therefore 
2.) Amendments are required via a new method which properly captures the expression 
of embodied religious experience.  
therefore 
3.) A method is offered which requires the amendment of three key notions: 
a. Conceptual metaphors are composed of cross domain mappings between 
internalised and external domains, not source and target domains. 
b. Conceptual schemata are structured by inter-personal meaning making, not 
only by immediate experience. 
c. Conceptual schemata depend on living conceptual metaphors and their 
exploratory function to remain vital in both new and old contexts, not only 
on their frequency of use. 
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Religious Expression via Living Inter-personal Conceptual Schemata 
 
The RELICS method is in essence a co-opting of the foundation of Lakoff and Johnson’s 
conceptual metaphor theory and a building upon those foundations within the context of 
embodied religious experience and its expression. In what follows is an explanation of the 
assertions above, however, these explanations will be presented in reverse to how they 
appear in the abbreviation. So we first elaborate on our particular version of conceptual 
schemata and how they operate before moving on to clarifying their inter-personal nature 
and why it is important that they are living and not dead.  
 
Conceptual Schemata and the Constitution of their Conceptual Metaphors  
 
If we want to understand the range of religious beliefs that constitute the diversity we see 
in the world then we need to look at the conceptual schemata which inform those beliefs. 
Specifically, the conceptual metaphors which comprise those conceptual schemata. 
Remembering that metaphor as an exploratory tool provides cognitive access to realities 
and concepts presumed to exist. They do not guarantee the existence of the concept they 
illustrate but they do allow the exploration and consideration of that concept. Further, no 
single metaphor can wholly explore a concept, which caters to the possibility of multiple 
concurrent metaphors.  
 
Now we turn to Madsen’s refutation of the invariance principle through his examples of 
bidirectional metaphor and sensory loss. With these he showed how an ordering from the 
abstract through to the embodied is not evidenced in the way some conceptual metaphors 
operate and relate to the concepts they explore. This is the motivation for a new 
conceptualisation of cross domain mappings. This is the same conceptualisation we first 
introduced at the end of Section II. To better represent the seemingly omnidirectional 
movement of conceptual metaphor we need to first rename our domains and then 
reconsider the movement that occurs when the mappings of these domains cross. 
 
Our new terms are the ‘internalised’ domain and ‘external’ domain. This new 
conceptualisation situates the individual as the boundary between domains when 
understanding conceptual metaphors. Instead of image schemata moving from source 
domain to target domain, an embodied experience of the external domain is met by the 
internalised image schemata. Alternatively internalised image schemata can be used to 
articulate or explore abstract concepts necessarily housed in the external domain. 
Essentially, instead of one domain supervening over the other as in the first system, the 
domains are on equal planes, which via cross domain mappings move towards each other to 
create a new central topography. This new topography is then internalised as conceptual 
schemata of an individual’s overarching conceptual system. 
 
This has parallels and was informed greatly by Janet Soskice’s interanimation theory where 
a metaphor is considered successful when it creates a new meaning that is based on the 
interanimation of the two concepts involved.187 This interanimation allows the generation of 
conceptual schemata and therefore can be applied within the context of religious 
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expression. The evocative function of metaphors is a boon when applied to embodied 
experience as it facilitates the exploration and a relating to and of those experiences. While 
conceptual metaphors may evoke a variety of responses, whether they be more broadly 
emotional or context dependent, this does not mean that those same metaphors have no 
explanatory or cognitive function. We can go a step further than this, arguing that not only 
do conceptual metaphors contain evocative and cognitive functions, it is the latter that 
supervenes on the former; a conceptual metaphor can only be effective when it is first 
regarded as reflection of the embodied experience of the individual. 
 
The Inter-Personal Nature of Conceptual Schemata 
 
The presence of an idealised individual at the centre of conceptual metaphor theory is a 
criticism that has been sounded in this paper. So in order to account for the variation 
between individuals and how they utilise conceptual schemata, we turn to the inter-
personal mediation of the image schemata used in their construction. Image-schemata is 
culturally constructed via the bidirectional transference between anthropogenetic 
development and cognitive processes.  
 
This is best exemplified in Madsen’s bag of marbles exercise. The shared meaning bag 
(conceptual metaphors) reflecting the average composition of the individual bags with the 
variation between those individual bags (personal conceptual schemata) remaining high. In 
this way individuals have access to the shared collection of conceptual metaphors which are 
in turn used to structure the conceptual schemata which inform their embodied experience. 
Here the Levinasian ethics we explored in Section I becomes valuable, as other-centredness 
becomes more apparent within this framework. Individuals must recognise and value the 
other, in one of its senses, because it is through inter-personal meaning creation that 
conceptual schemata becomes strengthened. A fortunate consequence of this is the 
possibility of compassion is not only fostered within but also between individuals.   
 
Within conceptual metaphor theory the immediacy of embodied experience is the 
foundation of conceptual metaphors. However this becomes problematic when considering 
sensory loss, trauma or other forms of paradigmatic shifts in the human experience. What 
asserting the inter-personal nature of conceptual metaphor accommodates is the 
understanding that we do not need to have personally embodied the same experience that 
motivates a conceptual metaphor in order to understand and use it. In other words, 
conceptual metaphors may initially arise in embodied experience, but their general use, and 
therefore adoption in an individual’s conceptual schemata, does not require that individual 
to have shared that experience.  
 
The Vitality of Conceptual Schemata Relies on Living Conceptual Metaphors 
 
Traditionally, dead metaphors are phrases in which their metaphorical meaning has become 
their first or only meaning. Living metaphors are phrases in which their metaphorical 
meaning requires interpretive effort. These characterisations are not entirely sufficient for 
conceptual metaphor, especially within the context of embodied religious experience. 
Instead here we maintain the dead/living dichotomy but redefine it within this context.   
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As posited briefly at the end of Section II, what makes conceptual metaphors alive or dead is 
their exploratory status. Dead conceptual metaphors currently exist in various religious 
traditions because we have assumptively designated them as such through a high frequency 
of use. The process of recalling high frequency metaphors becomes more and more refined, 
and so it becomes increasingly engrained in a particular context with a particular meaning. 
In other words, as specific phrases become more and more common the exploratory 
pathway becomes more trodden and less interpretive effort is made. 
 
Experimentation with image schemata and the construction and exploration of new 
conceptual metaphors is as essential for people in the present as the creation of the now 
traditional conceptual metaphors were essential to the people of the past. To explore new 
conceptual metaphors is not to forsake ‘old’ ones; it is to add to the collection of tools at 
our collective disposal. Importantly, the introduction of new conceptual metaphors within 
the context of religious expression allows for the potential of new experienced realities. 
‘Old’ conceptual metaphors share this potential as long as they are returned to an enlivened 
state whereby their exploratory function is restored over their explanatory function. This is 
achieved when we take the conceptual schemata we have internalised (and therefore take 
for granted) and re-envision them as external image schemata. Fittingly, this is echoed in 
Hick’s consideration of upaya or skilful means. Here skilful means could be considered as 
the continued enlivening of conceptual metaphors and understanding their restricted 
perspective not as a limitation but an opportunity for further exploration. Each religious 
tradition offers multiple conceptual metaphors to articulate embodied religious experience. 
The task of the individual is to find the conceptual metaphors that best articulate their 
experience.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS 
 
The first set of assertions is a re-positioning of the task at hand when it comes to accounting 
for religious diversity. The second set of assertions is the providing of a method by which 
that task may be undertaken. The RELICS method is an offering of a table at which different 
religious traditions, different religious people may share their embodied religious 
experiences and the differences between them can be celebrated and learned from. This is 
the true task of the hyper-pluralist. Through a mutual understanding of how living inter-
personal conceptual schemata shape our religious expressions this is possible.  
 
A more refined and therefore substantial RELICS method could find pragmatic application in 
a variety of contexts. Within religious conflict as part of peace negotiation strategies and 
within legislation as a new way of articulating and understanding religious expression. As 
well as within education, specifically secondary, as a means of studying religious traditions 
and beliefs that goes beyond comparative religion by exploring the conceptual schemata 
that inform those traditions and beliefs.  
 
So while we are at the end of this paper we are only approaching the start point. Many of 
the assertions made above, while supported by the previous sections, have only been 
provided with precarious foundations here. Many of these require more in-depth research 
whereby evidence can be collected and presented. Within a larger scope, it would be worth 
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investigating a possible connection between the issues of vagueness and borderline cases 
found in semantics and metaphysics with the characteristic vagueness of metaphor. 
Additionally, Janet Soskice’s interanimation theory of metaphor deserves more exploration 
than what has been provided here. Much like Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations 
(the echo of which can be found throughout), the work in this paper is fragmented in nature 
as it covers various disciplines and ideas within those disciplines. So in the attempt to rope 
them together the links between some of these ideas are currently characteristically thin. I 
mention Investigations by no means to draw parallels of quality between that and this, 
simply to account for this fragmentation. Naturally, the offering of the RELICS method will 
not be nearly as impactful as his language games, that being said, he did get to write in 
bullet points. Still, in offering this method I hope to have contributed to the true pluralist 
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